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RISKS OF BLOCKCHAIN FOR DATA PROTECTION: A
EUROPEAN APPROACH
By Briseida Sofia Jiménez-Gómez1
Blockchain has come to revolutionize commerce, driving faster and
more efficient transactions. This new technology was born to work in a
trustless environment, without any need for trusted intermediaries or
supervision by state agencies, leaving a digital print that is mostly public
and permanent. Nonetheless, the main problem it presents is that the use of
blockchain can interfere with an individual’s privacy rights. This article
explores the challenges posed by blockchain to data protection. Looking into
the characteristics of blockchain will be necessary to explore its advantages
and limits, especially from a privacy point of view. Blockchain is a kind of
technology that is currently disruptive, but its applications can be modulated
and configured in different ways depending on the needs. This article
examines the territorial and material scope of the General Data Protection
Regulation in order to clarify whether it is applicable to blockchain
technologies. The issue of identifiers on a blockchain, the allocation of
responsibility to participants, the tension with data subjects’ rights and, in
particular, the right to erasure are discussed. Some recommendations for
reconciling data protection and blockchain technologies are proposed, in
particular, projecting the privacy by design principle to blockchain
applications. Technological developments should not suppose a
deterioration of the rights of individuals. However, some technical solutions
entail significant trade-offs, as the case on anonymity in cryptocurrencies
illustrates.

1
Real Colegio Complutense Postdoctoral Fellow at the Harvard Law School Institute for Global
Law & Policy. PhD in Law Complutense University (Madrid). LL.M. College of Europe
(Brugge).
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DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR),
which became binding in 2009,2 states that “[e]veryone has the right to the
protection of personal data concerning him or her.”3 It expressly recognized
a right to the protection of personal data,4 but it also set out key data
protection principles,5 and ensured their application via an independent
regulatory authority.6 In this way, the EUCFR distinguished the right to data
protection from the right to privacy, departing from other human rights
instruments such as the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).7
However, as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) underlined
in the Digital Rights Ireland case, the two rights are connected.8
Accordingly, case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on
Article 8 of ECHR in relation to data protection remains relevant for the
purpose of the interpretation of Article 8 of EUCFR.
Moreover, Article 16 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) incorporated “the right to the protection of personal data,”9
adding a new legal basis for the regulation and reinforcement of data
protection in the European Union. The current European approach is defined
by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which empowers data
subjects by providing them with rights vis-à-vis data controllers and
processors.10 GDPR establishes a series of rights for data subjects: the right
to access collected personal data,11 the right to rectification,12 the right to
erasure,13 the right to restriction of processing,14 the right to data
2
The protection of fundamental rights in the EU, FACT SHEETS ON THE EUR. UNION,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/146/the-protection-of-fundamental-rights-inthe-eu.
3
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 10 [hereinafter EUCFR]. See generally Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European
Union art. 6(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter TFEU].
4
Id. art. 8(1).
5
Id. art. 8(2).
6
Id. art. 8(3).
7
Herke Kranenborg, Article 8 – Protection of Personal Data, in THE EU CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 223, 228 (Steve Peers et al. eds., 2014).
8
See Joined Cases C-293 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns,
Marine & Nat. Res., Minister for Justice, Equal. & Law Reform, The Comm’r of the Garda
Síochána, Ireland & the Att’y Gen., and Kärtner Landesregierung, Micharl Seitlinger, Christof
Tschohl & Others, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CA0293, ¶ 53 (Apr. 8, 2014) [hereinafter
Digital Rights Ireland].
9
TFEU, supra note 3, art. 16(1).
10
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 4 [hereinafter GDPR].
11
See id. art. 12–14.
12
Id. art. 16.
13
Id. art. 17.
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portability,15 the right to object to processing of personal data,16 and rights
related to automated decision-making and profiling.17
This fundamental protection nevertheless is not absolute, since the right
to data protection must be weighed frequently with other fundamental rights,
such as freedom of expression, the right to inform, and intellectual property
rights, among others.18 This weighing must be carried out under the principle
of proportionality. Naturally, these concerns may be resolved differently in
various national courts, the CJEU or the ECtHR. In any case, casuistic
analysis is required to such an extent that national weighing standards within
the European Union itself do not have to coincide, based on Article 85
GDPR in relation to reconcile freedom of expression and information with
data privacy.19
In some cases, the right to data protection is limited to those located in
the European Union, even though it may be considered a human right.20
Perspectives in the world regarding the right to data protection are not
uniform, nor are they expected to be. Recent laws, such as the California
Consumer Privacy Act,21 reflect the desire for greater data protection based
on European influences, and even international treaties like the Council of
Europe Convention 10822 have been revised in order to take the adoption of
the GDPR into account.23 Nevertheless, these advances do not employ a
common framework about users' rights to their data, in particular, the
necessity of a legal basis for processing personal data or (more
controversially) the right to be forgotten.
According to Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, Mariya
Gabriel:

14

Id. art. 18.
Id. art. 20.
GDPR, supra note 10, art. 21.
17
Id. art. 22.
18
See id. ¶ 4.
19
See id. ¶ 153.
20
See infra § III.
21
See generally California Consumer Privacy Act, S.B. 1121, 2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018).
22
See generally Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter Convention 108].
23
There has been a symbiotic relationship between the instruments adopted at international
level, in particular, the Convention 108, which served as a source of inspiration for European
Union Commission to formulate Directive 95/46. See generally Council Directive 95/46/EC,
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. Not surprisingly, Convention 108
influenced policy and legislation far beyond Europe. In the European Union, one of the
objectives of Directive 95/46 was to specify and expand the principles and rights of the
Convention 108. Id. ¶ 11. In 2018, the Council of Europe later revised Convention 108 by a
protocol incorporating the GDPR. GDPR, supra note 10. The Protocol was adopted by the
Committee of Ministers on 18 May 2018. See Decision of the Committee of Ministers, 128th
session of the Committee of Ministers, Elsinore, 18 May 2018, www.coe.int/dataprotection
15
16
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In the future, all public services will use blockchain technology,
Blockchain is a great opportunity for Europe and Member States
to rethink their information systems, to promote user trust and the
protection of personal data, to help create new business
opportunities and to establish new areas of leadership, benefiting
citizens, public services and companies.24
The European Commission has made evident efforts to promote the use of
blockchain. First, launching the E.U. Blockchain Observatory and Forum in
February 2018, and second, unsurprisingly, investing more than EUR 80
million in projects to enhance and support the use of blockchain in a wide
range of areas, with a view of dedicating approximately EUR 300 million
more to blockchain by 2020.25
Blockchain technologies entail fundamentally novel privacy concerns
that legal scholars must address. Despite the relatively recent adoption of
GDPR which took effect on May 25, 2018,26 the regulation did not consider
blockchain technology specifically. How then, will data protection concerns
be balanced against the use of blockchain technologies? Technology cannot
be isolated from economics and society when the reality is that technology is
the result of a human mind. Consequently, the use of blockchain cannot
operate on the outskirts of the law. GDPR takes a neutral approach, because
it does not target a specific class of technology, but applies to new
technologies in general. In this sense, a study addressing the difficulties that
blockchain poses to data protection does not recommend a revision of the
GDPR, but rather more regulatory guidance with regard to how concepts
must be applied in a blockchain context.27
This article seeks to contribute to the literature on the interplay
between data protection and blockchain technology. Blockchain seems to be
incompatible with many of the principles related to data protection that are
part of the E.U. acquis. However, it should be noted that the blockchain is a
kind of technology that is currently disruptive, but its applications can be
modulated and configured in different ways depending on the needs of
natural persons and organizations. In fact, the key question would be to
know if an organization, whether public or private, needs a blockchain.

24
European countries join Blockchain Partnership, EUR. COMMISSION (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/european-countries-join-blockchainpartnership.
25
Id.
26
GDPR, supra note 10, art. 99.
27
Michèle Finck, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation, EUR.
PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV. 97 (July 2019),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/634445/EPRS_STU(2019)634445
_EN.pdf.
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Depending on the organization’s private or public sector status and mission,
it may be appropriate or harmful to implement blockchain technology.
Section II of this article describes background about blockchain that it
is relevant to privacy law. Section III examines the territorial scope of the
GDPR. Section IV discusses the problem of identifiers in blockchain and the
risk of re-identification of data subjects. Section V analyzes the concept of
data controllers with respect to participants in a blockchain platform. Section
VI interprets the fundamental right to be forgotten in the context of a
blockchain platform. Section VII envisions different strategies for
reconciling blockchain platforms and GDPR. Finally, the last section
expresses some concluding remarks on the relation of blockchain and data
protection.
II.

EXPLORING BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES
A. Basics of Blockchain Terminology

Blockchain is a new global resource,28 a way of communicating and
storing information in a system without the need of a middleman. The term
“blockchain” relates to how data is stored on a ledger. Blockchain is defined
as a “type of database: a structured collection of information” where it is
essential the use of cryptographic functions to achieve two goals: data
integrity and data identity.29 Instead of storing data in an individual manner,
data is encrypted and collected on a block using cryptographic techniques.30
Then, there are two types of keys used to encrypt or decrypt data depending
on the sender and receiver of the information.31 Normally, the message is
encrypted with a private key known only to the sender and the receiver can
decrypt it using a public key provided by the sender.32
A ledger is a “place” to record all transactions that happen in the
system.33 It is similar to an accounting book or record of the operations
carried out, that act as a type of database with the information organized in a
certain way. One property of the ledger of most blockchain technologies is
immutability, which is considered essential for data integrity. Users are
allowed to enter new transactions but not to modify or delete what has been
28

Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Realizing the Potential of Blockchain 5 (World Econ. F.,
White Paper, 2017), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Realizing_Potential_Blockchain.pdf.
29
Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal Introduction to Distributed
and Centralized Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5–6 (2018).
30
Arvind Narayanan & Jeremy Clark, Bitcoin's Academic Pedigree, 60 COMM. OF THE ACM 38
(Dec. 2017).
31
See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS AND SOURCE
CODE IN C § 1.1 (John Wiley & Sons, 1996).
32
Bacon et al., supra note 29, at 14.
33
Narayanan & Clark, supra note 30, at 36.
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entered because it is “append only.”34 On the other hand, information gathers
in blocks. Each block is linked to the previous block and it is verified with a
timestamp35. Blocks are separately encrypted and stored in a chronological
order creating the chain.36
Besides, it is possible to obtain a succinct cryptographic digest, which
is a short string that prevent storing the whole ledger. Consequently, any
manipulation of the ledger would be reflected in the cryptographic digest.37
A blockchain is a network of nodes, where nodes are responsible to act
as a point of communication that can carry out different functions. Nodes on
the network can communicate directly with each other. Generally, a node is a
point where it is possible to receive, send or create a message.38 The
information is collectively stored in a peer-to-peer network, so the
communication infrastructure is distributed and not centralized.39 All nodes
are connected creating a global data structure. There are two kind of nodes
depending on the role to play: participating nodes and validating nodes.40
Participating nodes store synchronized copies of the data meanwhile
validating nodes are allowed to add data to the ledger, in accordance with a
consensus mechanism based on an agreed-upon algorithm.41 Validating
nodes have computing power and software to validate transactions.
Moreover, participating nodes can be full nodes or lightweight nodes
depending on how much data are stored by them.42 Nodes that store an entire
copy of all data are full nodes, ensuring the security and correctness of the
data.43 In contrast, a lightweight node appears when a user is connected to a
participating node but, in order to add data, it needs to connect to a full node

34

Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
36
See PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF
CODE 23 (Harv. U. Press, 2018).
37
Narayanan & Clark, supra note 30, at 38.
38
Blockchain and the GDPR, EUR. UNION BLOCKCHAIN OBSERVATORY AND F. 33 (Oct. 16,
2018),
https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/sites/default/files/reports/20181016_report_gdpr.pdf?width=
1024&height=800&iframe=true [hereinafter EU BLOCKCHAIN].
39
Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of
Blockchain, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1371 (2018).
40
EU BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 38, at 14.
41
Archana Prashanth Joshi et al., A survey on security and privacy issues of blockchain
technology, 1 MATHEMATICAL FOUND. OF COMPUTING 121, §§ 2.2, 2.4 (May 2018),
https://www.aimsciences.org/article/doi/10.3934/mfc.2018007.
42
John Evans, Blockchain Nodes: An In-Depth Guide, NODES.COM, https://nodes.com (last
visited March 19, 2020).
43
Id. The author further categorizes full nodes as pruned or archival nodes. Id. When pruned full
nodes reach the set limit, they retain only their headers and chain placement, and deletes the
oldest ones. Id. Archival nodes maintain the full blockchain in the database. Id.
35
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that synchronizes with the current state of the network.44 Thus, lightweight
nodes do not require so many resources at the expense of security.
B. Classification of Blockchain Technologies
Blockchain technologies can be classified in terms of how access and
adding information is structured. There are public or private blockchains and
permissioned or permissionless blockchains. First, a public blockchain
means that everyone can access to the network, in opposition to a private
blockchain where only a certain set of individuals has access to the
network.45 Parties in a private blockchain are often members of a group or
they will have to be authorized.46 Second, blockchain classification is based
on who can add information to the network. When anyone can post to the
network, the blockchain is called permissionless.47 Popular public and
permissionless blockchains are Bitcoin and Ethereum. By contrast, a
permissioned blockchain only allows an individual to add to the network
prior to an authorization.48
With public and non-permissioned blockchain applications, all parties
can download the open source software and participating in the network,
without asking prior permission and need to reveal true identity. Therefore,
from a data protection perspective, it is not indifferent setting up a public and
permissionless blockchain. For example, all data are on Bitcoin’s
blockchain, except the owners’ identities.49 The content of a document is
hashed through a hash function. The result of the hash function is a string of
digits to the input data called hash value.50 The block header is composed by
the hash of the previous block, timestamp and other metadata information.51
This information is public and creates automatic proof of the position and
ownership of each block of the chain.52 In principle, the private key is
required, which it is not stored on the ledger but rather in the owner’s wallet.
However, anybody can see who owns each block because of the block
header so it is possible to go through the chain following the links.53

44

Id.
Rebecca Lewis et al., Blockchain and Financial Market Innovation, FED. RES. BANK OF
CHICAGO (2017), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-perspectives/2017/7.
46
Joshi et al., supra note 41, § 2.1.5.
47
EU BLOCKCHAIN, supra note 38, at 14.
48
Id. at 14–15.
49
However, it is possible to discern the identities of the Bitcoin accounts and even the financial
transaction histories. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 68.
50
Bacon et al., supra note 29, at 9.
51
Id. at 12-13. See also Joshi et al., supra note 41, § 2.3.
52
Jude Umeh, Blockchain Double Bubble or Double Trouble?, 58 ITNOW 59 (2016).
53
Id.
45
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With public and permissioned blockchains applications, anyone can
gain access to the network, but authorization is necessary to be able to add
information. The Alastria Project in Spain is an example of this type of
network.54 It is the first multisectoral consortium promoted by companies
and institutions for the establishment of a semi-public blockchain
infrastructure. The mentioned project supports services with legal
effectiveness in the Spanish sphere and in accordance with European
regulation.55
Private and permissioned blockchains are suitable for companies in
highly regulated industries, such as banking and financial institutions. In
permissioned blockchain applications, an authority or consortium decides
who can engage in recording information to the shared database.56 Therefore,
allocating responsibility may be easier because the consortium or central
authority ultimately retains control and sets limits on who can access. For
instance, the Ripple protocol, which is used by banks, relies on a network of
selected participants that validates transactions records.57 Private and
permissioned blockchain applications tend to be faster than public, as the
mechanism for consensus is not based in Proof-of-Work, but Proof-of-Stake,
and the group of participants may be smaller than in permissionless
blockchains.58 The distinction between Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake
comes from how transactions are validated.59 A miner is a node that calculate
hash values. Every node in the network calculates the hash value in PoW.60
Miners add a random number, called a nonce, to the header of the block in
order to create a valid block.61 In contrast, a PoS protocol entails that miners
can mine or validate transactions in a block depending on the amount of the

54

See ALASTRIA: ASOCIACIÓN DE TECNOLOGÍAS DESCENTRALIZADAS/BLOCKCHAIN (2019),
https://alastria.io/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2019-07-11_Alastria-Presentacióncorporativa_v00.10-2.pdf.
55
Id. Some towns and regions are using blockchain to facilitate administrative procedure. Id. At
local level, Alcobendas in Madrid and at regional level, Xunta de Galicia can be mentioned. Id.
56
Lewis et al., supra note 45.
57
Vitalik Buterin, Introducing Ripple: A Detailed Look at Cryptocurrency’s New Kid on the
Block, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (Feb. 26, 2013), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/introducingripple.
58
Toshendra K. Sharma, Advantages and disadvantages of permissionless blockchain,
BLOCKCHAIN COUNCIL (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.blockchaincouncil.org/blockchain/advantages-and-disadvantages-of-permissionless-blockchain/.
59
Proof of Work vs Proof of Stake, BITDEGREE (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.bitdegree.org/tutorials/proof-of-work-vs-proof-of-stake/ (This tutorial considers
that the miner who finally gets the reward is the one who has the most powerful/quantity of
hardware devices in PoW; while in PoS the model randomly chooses the winner based on the
amount they have staked.)
60
Id.
61
Bacon et al., supra note 29, at 24.
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base cryptocurrency the user holds.62 PoS can save electricity costs and
allow faster blockchains potentially depending on the specific algorithm.63
Moreover, miners in PoS earn a transaction fee based on their contribution to
the network by freezing their coins as a deposit. Therefore, the reward is a
transaction fee proportionately to the amount they have invested.64
However, there are also some drawbacks in terms of security because
permissioned blockchains may be more vulnerable, since the network relies
on selected parties that could be an objective for hackers or parties could
collude to tamper the blockchain.65
This distinction is important for dealing with privacy issues. On one
hand, a permissionless blockchain is usually public when there are no
identity restrictions for participation, and anyone can participate without an
approval from a gatekeeper. At the same time, a participant can view
transaction data and download the entire ledger where all transactions are
tracked. According to the mysterious Satoshi Nakamoto, this system creates
a new privacy model similar to the level of information released by stock
exchanges.66 This contrasts with the traditional privacy model, where access
to transaction data is only allowed to the involved parties and a trusted third
party. The transparency of the system is a point of concern, because
transactions data are not only available to participants in the network, but
also, according to BlockExplorer,67 to anyone else. Therefore, the quid pro
quo exists, as a more transparent network undermines privacy.
On the other hand, a permissioned blockchain is inherently private
because a participant needs acceptance of the administrator to join the
network.68 The function of the administrator is similar to a gatekeeper. In
these systems, not everyone can see the transactions data; only the
participants that belong to the network.69 From a privacy point of view,
adjusting a permissioned blockchain may be a solution to comply with most
of data protection rules. Indeed, private and permissioned blockchains are
usually designed for a specific purpose, in contrast to public blockchains that
62

Joshi et al., supra note 41, §2.4.
Vitalik Buterin, On Stake, ETHEREUM BLOG (July 5, 2014),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/05/stake/
64
See BITDEGREE, supra note 59.
65
DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 30.
66
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN 6,
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
67
BLOCKEXPLORER, https://blockexplorer.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
68
Lewis et al., supra note 45 (“Permissioned blockchains allow certain members to control the
confirmation of transactions. These permissioning members (consensus authorities) can exert
control in various ways depending upon the network design. They could be responsible for
explicitly approving transactions. Another option would be to designate the permissioning
members as the sole members of the network able to participate in a cryptographic consensus
mechanism.”)
69
Id.
63

2020]

RISKS OF BLOCKCHAIN

291

tend to serve a general objective. Permissioned blockchains can be helpful
for internal use of specific companies or group of companies, for example, to
manage their client base. But we should highlight that so far, the most wellknown application of blockchain is related to cryptocurrencies and their
protocols are run on public networks. The truly innovative blockchain
technology rely on those applications that are public and permissionless.70
Based on the previous considerations, blockchains do not have certain
characteristics a priori, but those that are determined by its developers.
C. Applications of Blockchain
Distributed ledgers are driving disintermediation of traditional
intermediaries, resulting in efficient and speedy transactions, lower
transaction costs, and enhanced market access.71 Blockchain can be a
solution to some problems that our world encounters, inter alia, the problem
of identity theft as blockchain technology provides an immutable and secure
system; crashes of any server given that blockchain can also allow cloud
storage at different geographical points;
inefficiencies of logistics
management, because it improves monitoring of production or supervision
of food chains;72 simplifying payments in interbank payments with centrally
issued cryptocurrencies; reducing costs and time of interpretation of certain
“contracts,” known as smart-contracts,73 as these agreements can be fulfilled
automatically when they materialize through a computer program and their
compliance is not subject to the interpretation of any of the parties.74
Cryptocurrencies are the most famous applications of blockchain
technology. They could serve to transfer money abroad, in principle,
reducing the fees of exchanging in foreign currencies. Another promising
application appears to be the Singapore-based AirCarbon Exchange, which
70

DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 32.
Zetzsche et al., supra note 39, at 1367. For a discussion on applying blockchain to bills of
lading, see Naomi Chetrit et al., Not Just for Illicity Trade in Contraband Anymore: Using
Blockchain to Solve a Millennial-Long Problem with Bills of Lading, 22 VA. J.L. & TECH. [ii]
(2018).
72
See Adrien Ogee & Soichi Furuya, Blockchain is becoming key for global trade - but is that a
gift
for
hackers?,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
(Dec.
11,
2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/supply-chains-blockchain-cybersecurity-technology/
(“In the supply chain industry alone, distributed ledger technologies are expected to represent
close to $10 billion by 2025, up from $93 million in 2017.”).
73
Nick
Szabo,
Smart
Contracts,
PHONETIC
SCI.,
AMSTERDAM
(1994),
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwintersc
hool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html.
74
See Philip Boucher et al., How Blockchain Technology could change our lives, EUR.
PARLIAMENT
(Feb.
2017),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/581948/EPRS_IDA(2017)581948
_EN.pdf (discussing changes in currencies, digital content, patents, e-voting, smart contracts,
supply changes, decentralized autonomous organizations.).
71
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announced the launch of a global carbon market for airlines based on
blockchain technology.75 AirCarbon will be the first multi-stakeholder
carbon trading center in the world.76
However, some researchers have now casted doubt on the need for
blockchain in industries where it supposed blockchain was most useful.77 For
example, in supply chain management, if employees are not trustworthy, a
risk of compromising the whole supply chain exists. By contrast, if all
employees are trusted, a blockchain is not needed. Therefore, from a
macroeconomic perspective, prospects of establishing a single blockchain
for every supply chain does not seem very efficient.
In the public sector, blockchain could play a significant role in relation
to electoral processes. Open and fair electoral processes are a mainstay of
democracy, and the immutability of blockchains makes them an excellent
solution to ensure that votes are not being manipulated. However, imagine a
system of e-voting enabled by a public blockchain technology that does not
guarantee the maximum level of anonymity. In such a system, sophisticated
entities such as governments and corporations could single out individuals
according to political belief, compromising their fundamental right to data
protection and privacy.78
In addition, it is noteworthy to mention that blockchain’s advantages
may not be considered necessary in other contexts, such as case management
in international arbitration. Some reasons are related to the time and cost of
processing blockchain-based transactions, the relatively common
management of documents using third-party cloud storage providers by
arbitral tribunals, and the fact that arbitral institutions already have in place a
secured website.79 This evidence suggests that not every problem in the
digital space must be solved by blockchain technology, especially when the
current system is efficient and trustworthy.

75
@Operem, Creating a Cleaner Future with AirCarbon, MEDIUM (May 13, 2019),
https://medium.com/@operem_corp/creating-a-cleaner-future-with-aircarbon-83b19243eccf.
76
Singapore-based AirCarbon Pte Ltd launches world’s first digital aviation carbon exchange
to fight climate change, RHT FINTECH HOLDINGS PTE. LTD. (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.rhtgoc.com/news/press-release/singapore-based-aircarbon-pte-ltd-launches-worldsfirst-digital-aviation-carbon-exchange-to-fight-climate-change/.
77
See generally Karl Wust & Arthur Gervais, Do you Need a Blockchain?, INT’L ASS’N FOR
CRYPTOLOGIC RES. (2018), https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/375.pdf.
78
See Guy Zyskind, Oz Nathan & Alex ‘Sandy’ Pentland, Decentralizing Privacy: Using
blockchain to Protect Personal Data, 2015 IEEE CS SECURITY AND PRIVACY WORKSHOPS 180,
183 (2015) (discussing how certain anonymized datasets can be “de-anonymized” due to a
“small amount of data points or high dimensionality data.”).
79
Ashish Chugh, Why We Don’t Need Blockchain to Manage Cases in International
Arbitration, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 13, 2018),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/05/13/dont-need-blockchain-manage-casesinternational-arbitration/.
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D. Limits of Blockchain
There is still a misconception around blockchain technologies (and
cryptocurrencies) with regard to anonymity. Some claim that
cryptocurrencies are by definition anonymous80 or that blockchains ensure
privacy thanks to a sophisticated asymmetric double key system, based on
the use of two different keys.81 Nonetheless, the degree of anonymity will
depend on the underlying protocol in the blockchain. For example,
transactions carried out by Bitcoin are not anonymous, as revealed in the
Silk Road investigation.82 A study classifies most cryptocurrencies as
pseudo-anonymous83 and, notably, the interference with privacy of
individuals has motivated the creation of “altcoins.”84 Altcoins are all
cryptocurrencies other than Bitcoin.85 Privacy coins are an evolution of
cryptocurrencies designed to ensure privacy for financial information of a
user.86 The coin can afford privacy of transactions by design (i.e. Monero or
Zerocash)87 or it can be an option for users (i.e. Zcash or Dash).88 Therefore,
it seems evident that in order to alleviate the privacy interference of a fully
transparent blockchain, a number of techniques have been proposed.
Creating privacy coins as alternative cryptocurrencies shows the awareness
of users of their data protection rights.
One of the advantages of blockchain technologies is enhancing
transparency and accountability of transactions. At least one study goes
beyond this, claiming that “the popularity of blockchain technology may also
80
See Nieves Pacheco Jiménez, Criptodivisas: del Bitcoin al MUFG. El potencial de la
tecnología Blockchain, 19 REVISTA CESCO DE DERECHO DE CONSUMO 6, 7 (2016) (“son
anónimas, permitiendo preservar la privacidad en las transacciones.”).
81
See JAVIER W. IBAÑEZ JIMÉNEZ, DERECHO DE BLOCKCHAIN Y DE LA TECNOLOGÍA DE
REGISTROS DISTRIBUIDOS (Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, Cap. 1.I.7., 2018).
82
See generally David Adler, Silk Road: The Dark Side of Cryptocurrency, FORDHAM J.
OF CORP. & FIN. LAW (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/02/21/silk-road-the-dark-side-ofcryptocurrency/#_edn1.
83
Dr. Robby Houben & Alexander Snyers, Cryptocurrencies and blockchain, EUR.
PARLIAMENT 29 (July 2018),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20on%20cryptocurrencies%
20and%20blockchain.pdf.
84
See Mauro Conti et al., A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin, CORNELL U.
ARXIV tbl. V (Dec. 25, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.00916.pdf.
85
Houben & Snyers, supra note 83, at 29.
86
See Tiffany Madison, Privacy Coins: How Monero, Dash, and ZCash Will Enable True
Privacy, MEDIUM (Mar. 28, 2019), https://blog.goodaudience.com/privacy-coins-what-youneed-to-know-975a3460d944; Conti et al., supra note 84, § 5.
87
Zerocash is untraceable. ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY
TECHNOLOGIES 190 (drft. 2016), https://www.lopp.net/pdf/princeton_bitcoin_book.pdf. See also
Aziz, Guide on Privacy Coins: Comparison of Anonymous Cryptocurrencies, MASTER THE
CRYPTO, https://masterthecrypto.com/privacy-coins-anonymous-cryptocurrencies/ (last visited
Mar. 24, 2020).
88
Madison, supra note 86.
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reflect an emergence social trend to prioritize transparency over
anonymity.”89 However, in practice, natural and legal persons are not
comfortable enough with the technology to publish all their information onto
a public database,90 in particular when sensitive information or financial
information is at stake. The problem does not arise with legal persons
because they do not have a right to personal data protection.91 But, according
to the Technology Director of the Open Data Institute, the transparency and
irreversibility of blockchain technologies with regards to natural persons
make them unsuitable for storing personal data.92 This evidence suggests that
blockchains cannot coexist with the GDPR.
Despite the advocates for blockchain technology, presently it is still a
slower method for executing transactions. It takes ten minutes to mine each
block,93 which means that each transaction needs this period of time to
become effective. Moreover, there is sometimes a waiting list, a
“Mempool,”94 as not all transactions can be packed in every block every ten
minutes. So, it is not rare that the time may be extended during peak periods.
For example, when comparing transaction speeds between credit cards and
cryptocurrencies, in aggregate Visa and Mastercard can process, “more than
5,000 transactions per second with capacity to process volumes multiple
times that number.”95 Visa can handle 1,700 transactions per second (tps) or
around 150 million of transactions every day.96 Meanwhile, Ethereum and
Bitcoin only confirm 20 and 7 tps. respectively.97 These numbers may be
improved in the future, but it is argued that a potential limit for Bitcoin is 27

89

Boucher et al., supra note 74, at 22.
Vitalik Buterin, Privacy on the Blockchain, ETHEREUM BLOG (Jan. 15, 2016),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/01/15/privacy-on-the-blockchain (mentioning the possibility that
someone else related to a domestic or foreign government, business companies, coworkers and
family members is able to see the information stored on a public blockchain).
91
GDPR, supra note 10, ¶ 14.
92
Umeh, supra note 52, at 61.
93
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https://www.investinblockchain.com/how-long-does-it-take-to-mine-bitcoin/.
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Ofir Beigel, The Bitcoin Mempool – A Beginner’s Explanation, 99 BITCOINS (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://99bitcoins.com/bitcoin/mempool/.
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18, 2017, 8:24 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-bitcoin-wont-displace-visa-or-mastercard-soon-201712-15.
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See Kenny Li, The Blockchain Scalability Problem & the Race for Visa-Like Transaction
Speed, HACKERNOON (Jan. 26, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/the-blockchain-scalabilityproblem-the-race-for-visa-like-transaction-speed-5cce48f9d44.
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See Sean Williams, Which Cryptocurrencies Have the Fastest Transaction Speeds?, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 14, 2018, 8:06 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/01/14/whichcryptocurrencies-have-the-fastest-transactio.aspx (discussing Ripple, a cryptocurrency that
handles 1,500 tps.).
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tps.98 In general, it was pointed out that blockchain technologies are
inefficient by design, because every fully potential node must proceed every
transaction and maintain a copy of every state.99 The qualities that benefit
security come at the expense of performance. In a similar vein, blockchain
technologies are considered not yet mature due to “severe technical and
procedural limitations.”100 In brief, practical barriers prevent realizing a
mainstream use of blockchain technologies.
Blockchain is presented as a solution for trustless environments.
However, two premises follow. The first one is that users cannot do without
trust in the system. The second one is that new intermediaries replace
traditional intermediaries.
1.

Users cannot do without trust in the system

Users cannot do without trust in the system, whether digital or analog.
Blockchain does not move from a system where trust is necessary to another
based on code where trust is unnecessary. The literature usually refers to a
“trusted” record,101 which suggests users begin to place confidence in the
actors that make blockchain infrastructure possible. Without confidence in
the developers or in the intermediaries that act as service providers, users
would not use a blockchain system.102 Another perspective to look at it is
that users need to trust blockchain technology (the cryptography, the
protocols, the software, the computers and the network). Bruce Schneier
argues that there is no good reason to trust blockchain technology.103 His
98
Evangelos Georgiadis, How many transactions per second can bitcoin really handle?
Theoretically.,
INT’L
ASS’N
FOR
CRYPTOLOGIC
RES.
(Apr.
1,
2019),
https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/416.pdf.
99
Preethi Kasireddy, Fundamental Challenges with Public Blockchains, MEDIUM (Dec. 10,
2017), https://medium.com/@preethikasireddy/fundamental-challenges-with-publicblockchains-253c800e9428.
100
MICHÈLE FINCK, BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 31 (2018). See
generally Edmund Schuster, Cloud Crypto Land (London Sch. of Econ. Law, Soc’y & Econ.
Working Papers, Paper No. 17/2019, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3476678 (“Legal and practical obstacles
therefore mean that, at least outside its original and circumscribed realm of cryptocurrencies,
blockchain technology has no future.”).
101
See, e.g., David Rountree, Navigating the Blockchain and the Law, 26 LSJ: LAW SOCIETY OF
NSW JOURNAL 72 (2016).
102
See, e.g., Angela Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust: Software Developers as Fiduciaries of the
Public Blockchains, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN. TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
58-81 (Hacker, P. et al eds., 2019); Rebecca M. Bratspies, Cryptocurrency and the Myth of the
Trustless Transaction, 25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1, 18–46 (2018) (explaining the ledgers of trust
embedded in cryptocurrencies in particular).
103
Bruce Schneier, There’s No Good Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology, WIRED (June 6,
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/theres-no-good-reason-to-trust-blockchain-technology/
(“[Y]ou need to trust them absolutely, because they’re often single points of failure . . . .
Would you rather trust a human legal system or the details of some computer code you don’t
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arguments relate to the misplacement of trust from humans to technology as
an abstract concept.104 This demonstrates that trust in the system is still
relevant.
In the context of cryptocurrencies, users need to rely on wallets105 in
order to complete transactions; or on exchanges106 to carry out
cryptocurrencies exchanges for fiat money.107 Therefore, if someone pays
with bitcoins, and sells bitcoins in exchange for a good, the individual will
need a wallet of bitcoins or a wallet service in the cloud, where the bitcoins
that are his/her “property” are stored. The privacy issue emerges while using
the wallet. The individual needs a bitcoin address assigned by the
intermediary and a user number, which can be traced to the origin of the
transaction.108 In some cases, even wallet services require users to register a
phone number and an email address. This information allows the
identification of the subject behind each transaction by combining the data of
the Bitcoin address with the brokers' records, whether wallets or
exchanges.109 Users give up control of their bitcoins using an exchange or
bitcoin wallet, because users do not generate their Bitcoin account and so
they do not have their private key when signing with an intermediary
(exchange or bitcoin wallet).110 Rather, transactions are first authenticated
between users and the trading venue. In spite of the initiative of users in
generating a transaction, the final check is done by the exchange, so the
exchange controls the transaction and sets limits.111 In this scenario, users
only order the intermediary to carry out certain transactions. As a result,
users have no direct influence on data processing, but rather the
intermediaries have a decisive influence on data processing.112
have the expertise to audit?”).
104
Id.
105
Bitcoin wallets do not physically store the bitcoins, but instead store the public and private
keys necessary to manage the bitcoins, which are on the network. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra
note 87, at 112.
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visited Mar. 26, 2020); POLONIEX, https://poloniex.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); KRAKEN,
https//www.kraken.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). See also Becky Leighton, What is a
cryptocurrency exchange and how do they work?, COIN INSIDER (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://www.coininsider.com/cryptocurrency-exchanges/.
107
See generally Bratspies, supra note 102.
108
See Danny Bradbury, How to Use Bitcoin, THE BALANCE (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.thebalance.com/how-to-use-bitcoins-391214.
109
For example, see the Abra mobile Bitcoin wallet. Ofir Beigel, Best Bitcoin Wallets for iOS
(iPhone, iPad), 99 BITCOINS (Nov. 13, 2019), https://99bitcoins.com/bitcoin-wallet/ios-iphoneipad/.
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In addition, doubts about the reliability of companies supporting a
cryptocurrency, like in the case of Facebook with Libra, confirms how a new
cryptocurrency cannot stay without trust.113 Facebook tries to build trust at
least in two ways. First, working in collaboration with twenty-seven other
companies and promising that the digital currency would be overseen by an
independent nonprofit, called the Libra Association,114 based in
Switzerland.115 Second, Facebook launched Calibra, which is its subsidiary
that promises not to mingle users’ Libra payments with Facebook data.116 By
contrast, the most famous cryptocurrency so far, Bitcoin, is successful
because users trust it and think it has value.117
2.

New intermediaries replace traditional intermediaries

One advantage of using blockchain is getting rid of third-party
intermediaries, because algorithms would substitute the need of middlemen.
Bitcoin, launched by the still-unknown Satoshi Nakamoto, was founded on a
lack of trust, a problem that created and explained the financial crisis
according.118 The mere possibility of market reversal increases the need for
trust. Therefore, an immutable record of ledgers can solve this issue in the
future, since record-keeping will be public, decentralized, and tamper-proof.
In addition, the intrinsic characteristics of the transactions’ record will make
intermediaries unnecessary. However, in the finance context, far from
dispensing with the use of intermediaries, new intermediaries have arrived,
benefiting from the legal framework gap surrounding cryptocurrencies.119
The promise that blockchain will make the middlemen disappear is
reminiscent of the similarities of Amazon's first business model on the faith
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of "friction-free capitalism."120 Selling directly to the consumer through the
possibilities of the Internet would reduce the costs of intermediary services
(warehouses, retailers, and distribution networks). Nevertheless, the location
of a consumer is not irrelevant, because without a giant inventory and giant
warehouses distributed throughout the world, Amazon could not meet the
demand of consumers in the required time or deal with the inconveniences
caused by returns.
The existence of cryptocurrencies proves that as new intermediaries
(wallets, exchanges, oracles, etc.) emerge, the market for digital assets does
not behave in the same way as the market of physical assets. For example, in
Bitcoin’s case, most users interact with blockchains through
intermediaries.121 Intermediaries will still need to manage changing
circumstances, providing information, or connecting the blockchain data
with other sources of data, such as national registries. Therefore, this
supposedly miraculous technology engenders risks in terms of lack of
regulation of activities, including intermediaries, at the expense of investor
protection standards, often related to money laundering and cybercrimes.
III.

THE EXTENSIVE TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE GDPR
A. Direct applicability throughout the European Union

The GDPR is directly applicable in all Member States.122 It provides a
uniform level of protection throughout the European Union, which
overcomes some of the difficulties experienced by the application of national
laws transposing the Data Protection Directive.123 The Regulation has a twofold purpose. The first purpose is to complete the legal gaps and ensure the
effective exercise of the right to data protection, considering the fundamental
right of data protection in article 8(1) of the EUCFR124 and article 16(1) of
the TFEU.125 The second purpose is to ensure the free flow of personal data
between Member States as part of the internal market.126

120
“Friction-free capitalism” is a term coined by Bill Gates to refer the Internet as a powerful
tool to eliminate the middleman in conducting transactions. See BILL GATES, NATHAN
MYHRVOLD, AND PETER RINEARSON, THE ROAD AHEAD (1995).
121
KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 98 (MIT
Press, 2018).
122
See GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 99.
123
Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 4.
124
EUCFR, supra note 3, art. 8(1).
125
TFEU, supra note 3, art. 16(1); GDPR, supra note 10, ¶1. See Peter Hustinx, EU Data
Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General Protection
Regulation, in New Technologies and EU Law, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND EU LAW 151
(Cremona, M. ed., Oxford U. Press, 2017).
126
See GDPR, supra note 10, ¶ 10.
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The territorial scope of the GDPR determines under which conditions
European law is applicable to activities carried out by controllers or
processors of personal data, even though they may not be established within
the European Union.127 With a similar objective, the criteria for processing
personal data is relevant to determine the competence of the supervisory
authorities of Member States. A significant difference between the last
regime and the current one is that the function of article 4 of the repealed
Data Protection Directive128 determined the national law applicable to a
processing activity, meanwhile article 3 of the GDPR defines the territorial
scope of the regulation. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that inasmuch as
the GDPR leaves a margin of appreciation to Member States’ national laws
and that these laws are not uniform, it could be relevant to determine the
applicable law of a Member State. In such a scenario, article 3 of the GDPR
can be a useful source of inspiration to specify the national law applicable.129
There are two alternative connecting factors that trigger the application of
the GDPR: the establishment of a controller or processor within the
European Union and the targeting and monitoring criteria for individuals
located in the European Union.
B. Significance of establishment within the European Union
Pursuant to article 3(1) GDPR, the processing of personal data must be
carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller
or a processor in the European Union, regardless of whether the processing
takes place in or outside the European Union.130 This rule follows the Data
Protection Directive criterion, where the location of a controller or a
processor within the European Union is decisive.131 Thus, regardless of the
real location of the personal data processing, for example, in a third country
where the parent company has its headquarters, when a corporation has a
subsidiary in a Member State of the European Union, the GDPR may apply
to the subsidiary.
In addition, GDPR refers to the establishment of the data processor and
not only the controller, which is a novelty in comparison with the Data
Protection Directive. This change expands the scope of the GDPR. A
processor located in the European Union, that acts on behalf of a controller

127

Id. art. 3.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 4.
129
Pedro A. De Miguel Asensio, Competencia y Derecho aplicable en el Reglamento General
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130
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outside the European Union, will have to respect E.U. law, which prevents
the Union to become a data haven.
Moreover, a functional approach to determine an “establishment”
prevails. According to GDPR recital 22, an “establishment” is understood as
an effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements.132
Therefore, the concept of an “establishment” is sufficiently flexible because
“the degree of stability of the arrangements and the effective exercise of
activities in that other Member State must be interpreted in the light of the
specific nature of the economic activities and the provision of services
concerned.”133
Yet, this interpretation does not mean that the concept of an
“establishment” is defined without limits. The Court acknowledged in Verein
für Konsumenteninformation that the mere fact of having an undertaking’s
website accessible in the European Union does not signify that a nonEuropean entity has an establishment in the European Union.134 Applying
this ruling to a blockchain context, when validating nodes and participating
nodes, that may be considered controllers or processors,135 are established
outside the European Union, the entity does not constitute an establishment
in the Union merely due to the fact that the blockchain network is accessible
in the Union. This situation often happens in a public and permissionless
blockchain.
A more difficult notion to interpret is whether the activities of the
controller or data processor related to personal data processing occurs “in the
context of activities of” an E.U. establishment.136 In the Google Spain case,
the CJEU determined that a connection is necessary between the activities of
the company carrying out the processing of data and the subsidiary
established in the European Union.137 Personal data processing occurs in the
context of activities of an E.U. establishment when the activities of the
controller situated in a third country are “inextricably linked” to the activities
carried out by an establishment in a Member State.138 For example, if the
parent company is a social network in a third State, while the subsidiary,
established in the European Union, sells food products without any
132

GDPR, supra note 10, ¶ 22.
Case C-230/14, Weltimmo s.r.o. v. Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság,
2015 EUR-Lex CELEX 62014CJ0230, ¶ 29 (Oct. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Weltimmo].
134
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CELEX 62015CJ0191, ¶ 76 (July 28, 2016) [hereinafter Amazon EU Sarl].
135
See infra Section V on the discussion about considering nodes controllers or processors.
136
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connection with the social network, there is no relationship in the context of
the activities.139 Conversely, the activities of the company situated in a third
State and those of its establishment located in the Member State are
“inextricably linked” when the activities serve to obtain funds that renders
the activity of the company situated in a third State profitable.140 Google
Spain was a case that held a relationship exists between Google Inc. in the
United States, and Google Spain SL in Spain, as the advertising space
offered by Google Spain makes the search engine profitable.141 Some
criticism arose concerning the wide interpretation of processing of personal
data “in the context of the activities” of an establishment of the controller in
a Member State, because it could be used to cover situations with a lack of a
significant link with the European Union.142 However, on similar grounds,
the CJEU recently confirmed that the activities of Google France related to
the advertising space are inextricably linked to the processing of personal
data carried out for the purposes of operating the search engine concerned.143
Therefore, unsurprisingly, the activities of the establishment of Google
France are covered by the scope of the Directive and the GDPR. Moreover,
the processing of personal data is considered to be a single act due to the
existence of gateways between its various national versions.144
On the other hand, the European Data Protection Board advises that
[T]he existence of an establishment within the meaning of the
GDPR should not be interpreted too broadly to conclude that the
existence of any presence in the EU with even the remotest links
to the data processing activities of a non-EU entity will be
sufficient to bring this processing within the scope of EU data
protection law.145
139

Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Update of Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law in
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It must be highlighted that regardless of the location or the nationality of the
data subject whose personal data is being processed, when the processing
occurs in context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or
processor in the Union, it would fall under the scope of the GDPR.146
Locating a controller in a single jurisdiction is challenging in a public
and permissionless blockchain. For example, Bitcoin has 1,803 nodes in
Germany, 589 nodes in France and 468 nodes in the Netherlands, without
prejudice of more nodes in other Member States.147 As case law suggests, a
broad interpretation of establishment of the controller would mean that
where nodes, considered as controllers, exist in the European Union,148 the
GDPR applies to them. This view is problematic because it is impossible to
determine the hierarchy of controllers for other nodes located in third
countries. A possible indication would be to refer to the location of full
nodes that keep all the ledger and, if they are located within the European
Union, GDPR should apply. However, this solution would not solve the
problem of a lack of reference to a “main establishment.”149
By contrast, determining the establishment of the data controller would
be easier if an identifiable person operates or established the blockchain,
which is the case of a private and permissioned blockchain. For example, a
consortium of banks or a financial entity that sets up a blockchain to manage
clients’ data.
C. The targeting and monitoring criteria to individuals located within
the European Union
Regarding the first GDPR connecting factor, namely the establishment
of controllers and processors in the European Union, companies without any
establishment in the European Union, but those who process personal data of
people in the European Union, would be exempted from complying with the
GDPR. However, to avoid this problem, a second connecting factor exists
(i.e. targeting and monitoring criteria for individuals located in the European
Union). The GDPR shows an evolution in comparison with the rules set up
in the repealed Directive. The Data Protection Directive focused on the
equipment, automated or otherwise, for purposes of processing personal data
by a controller not established in the European Union.150 This approach was
considered excessive and a source of legal uncertainty, because it could
r_public_consultation_en_1.pdf.
146
Id. at 10.
147
Global Bitcoin Nodes Distribution, BITNODES, https://bitnodes.earn.com (last visited Mar.
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See infra Section V on the discussion about considering nodes controllers or processors.
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GDPR, supra note 10, ¶ 36.
150
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cover situations that lacks a link with the European Union. For instance, this
could apply to third country citizens who are not residents within the
European Union.151
The new approach, which constitutes the second connecting factor, is
based on a “targeting” criteria.152 Under article 3(2) GDPR, when the
controller or processor is located outside the European Union, the Regulation
focuses on whether the processing activities are related to offering goods or
services to data subjects situated in a Member State; or the processing
activities relate to the monitoring of their behavior, as far as their behavior
takes place in the European Union.153 Interestingly, some versions of the
GDPR refer to “residents” in the European Union, suggesting a protection
limited only to residents in the European Union.154 By contrast, other
versions mention data subjects “who are” in the Union in conformity with
GDPR recital 14, which covers “natural persons, whatever their nationality
or place of residence.”155 The fact that GDPR was modified in comparison
with the proposal of the Commission, at least in some versions, is in favor of
the latter interpretation. The protection of personal data is enhanced with
European rules, provided that natural persons (for example, users of
blockchain) are in the European Union. Despite some language versions of
the GDPR, it seems more appropriate to understand that the protection must
be applied to natural persons, regardless of their nationality or place of
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residence.156 The processing of users’ personal data, to whom goods and
services are directed, is the relevant element that determines that the
obligations for processing of the controller(s) and processor(s) are governed
by the GDPR. Therefore, the inclusion of clients or users residing in the
European Union is an indication that the controller intends to offer goods
and services to data subjects, whose personal data is processed, in the
European Union.
Offering goods and services does not require a payment by the data
subject. The difficult issue could be to establish when the controller or the
processor plans to offer services to data subjects situated within the
European Union. According to the jurisprudence from the CJEU, to
determine the intention of a trader and a given consumer, certain types of
information is not deemed sufficient evidence to indicate that a trader is
directing its commercial activity to a Member State where the consumer has
his habitual residence. A consumer contract is necessary in order to apply the
rules of jurisdiction over consumer contracts, which contrasts with the rules
on data protection, where no contract is pertinent. However, the list provided
in the Pammer case can offer guidance for interpretation of the art. 3(2)(a) of
the GDPR.157 The Pammer criteria is not exhaustive; however, it can be
useful to analyze if the controller or the processor envisages to offer services
to data subjects situated in one or more Member States. For example, the
trader’s email or geographical address, or a telephone number without an
international code do not indicate that a trader envisages conducting its
activity in a Member State.158
On one hand, GDPR recital 23 states that the mere accessibility of the
controller’s, processor’s, or the intermediary’s website in the European
Union, or the use of a language and a currency that is generally used in one
or more Member States is not sufficient.159 However, on the other hand, it is
clear that the activities directed to one or more Member States when
processing activities is related to the offering of goods or services, and
effectively the consumer or user can order goods and services by selecting
one language and one currency. Another pertinent factor is the inclusion of
clients or users domiciled in the European Union. In addition, the use of a
top-level domain name other than that of the Member State in which the
controller or processor is established, or the use of neutral top-level domain
156
EUR. DATA PROTECTION BOARD, supra note 145, at 15; De Miguel Asensio, supra note 129,
at 85 (providing justifications for modifying the Commission proposal in the final Regulation.).
157
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159
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names such as “.com” or “.eu,”160 represents further evidence that the
controller envisages offering goods and services to data subjects in the
Union. Thus, when it is apparent from the evidence, the controller or
processor of data must comply with the GDPR.
For public and permissionless blockchains, it is likely that they fall
under the application of the GDPR when there is an offer to use a service,
such as bitcoin, thereby addressing data subjects in the European Union,
despite the fact that anyone can register an account. Users do not maintain a
contract with the software that allows the public blockchain infrastructure, so
when users contract with the intermediaries (wallets and exchanges), they are
required to be subject to the terms and conditions of the software. However,
the terms and conditions of the platforms that support public and
permissionless blockchains do not usually say anything about data
protection.161 For instance, it is not clear which is the legal basis to process
data, according to the Bitcoin Core privacy policy, as there is not indication
of any applicable law.162 In contrast, Ethereum sets standard-form terms that
cover data protection by reference to their privacy policy where they state to
comply with the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection ("FADP"), the Swiss
Ordinance to the Federal Act on Data Protection ("OFADP") and the General
European Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR").163 According to their
policy, Ethereum “contractually ensure that the protection of your personal
data corresponds to that in Switzerland and the European Union at all times
by concluding agreements using the standard contractual clauses and
complying with the GDPR.”164 However, the fact that the terms of use of the
website can change at the sole discretion of the Ethereum Foundation and are
effective immediately could have a negative impact on users.165 This
situation contrasts with private and permissioned blockchain that could
hamper Europeans to register on the platform and avoid being under the
scope of the GDPR.
The last criterion to apply the GDPR is based on situations where
Member State law applies by virtue of public international law (art. 3 (3)
GDPR), even though a controller is not established in the Union.166 This
provision is not new, as it was already set in the Directive 95/46.167 GDPR
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recital 25 provides an example of a Member State’s diplomatic mission or
consular post.168
The extraterritorial scope of GDPR is sufficiently extensive to cover
many blockchain platforms with regard to the location of nodes outside the
European Union, provided that goods or services are offered to data subjects
in the Union, or the processing activities are related to the monitoring of data
subjects’ behavior in the Union.
IV.

DEALING WITH PERSONAL DATA IN BLOCKCHAIN
A. Identifiers: public keys and additional data

A first question that emerges with identifiers is which data used in
relation to blockchain should be qualified as personal data. It must be
stressed that data which potentially identifies a person is to be regarded as
personal data.169 Any objective or subjective information pertaining to the
private life of a person is personal data.170 GDPR recital 26 highlights a
scenario where there is a reasonable likelihood that certain means are used to
identify a natural personal, considering the available technology, the cost and
the time required for identification.171 According to Advocate General
Campos Sánchez-Bordona, whose reasoning was followed by the CJEU in
the Breyer case, the risk of identification appears to be insignificant if the
identification of the data subject was prohibited by law or practically
impossible on account of the fact that it requires a disproportionate effort in
terms of resources (such as time, cost and man-power).172 Naturally, not only
the data users, but also the data recipient may attempt to identify the
individual, which must be taken into consideration. Definition of personal
data could be surrounded by uncertainty, because data that apparently is not
personal could become personal when technological developments are
applied. Therefore, the possibility to infer information about natural persons
from different kinds of data make it difficult to distinguish between personal
and non-personal data.
On one hand, the GDPR provides a non-exhaustive list of identifiers: a
name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or one or
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental,
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economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.173 On the other
hand, the CJEU has determined that an IP address is personal data.174 Further
examples of online identifiers are expressly mentioned in GDPR recital 30
such as cookie identifiers or radio frequency identification tags.175
Moreover, the identification of the data subject can be determined
indirectly. The retained data may allow reaching very precise conclusions
regarding the private lives of individuals, like “the habits of everyday life,
permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the
activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and social
environment frequented by them.”176 For example, “dynamic” IP addresses
may allow for indirect identification. “Dynamic” IP addresses are
provisional addresses assigned for each internet connection and replaced
when subsequent connections are made, as opposed to “static” IP addresses,
which are invariable and allow continuous identification of the device
connected to the network.177 The CJEU held that dynamic IP addresses are
personal data when the online media services provider has the legal means
which may reasonably be used to identify the data subject, with the
assistance of other persons, in particular the competent authority and the
internet service provider, on the basis of the IP addresses stored.178 The
combination of information not necessarily in the hands of one person may
enable the identification of the data subject.179
Consequently, there exists a broad meaning of personal data to cover
any information that by reason of its content, purpose or effect, is linked to a
particular person.180 In light of GDPR recital 30, online identifiers are
pseudonymous, but can become personal data “when combined with unique
identifiers and other information receive by the servers, may be used to
create profiles of the natural persons and identify them.”181 Bearing in mind
that pseudonymous data qualifies as personal data,182 the consequence is that
public keys are personal data under the GDPR. Guidance from the Article 29
173
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Working Party broaches three criteria to determine the possibility of reidentification by: (1) singling out an individual; (2) linking records relating
to an individual; and (3) inferring information concerning an individual.183
Public keys function as identifiers in a blockchain structure when they
combine with other information. They can be considered a technology
requirement to the functioning of the blockchain.184 However, the option of
using one-time public keys will minimize the risk of re-identification by
singling out, linkability, or inference methods with additional data.185
Additional data are data related to the blockchain transaction. For
example, assets exchanged, the qualifications of a person, address, financial
data related to a natural person and any data that meets the requirement of
identifying a person directly or indirectly. The French Data Protection
authority recommends not to include additional data on a plain form and to
use encryption techniques like commitment and keyed hash functions.186
B. Risks of re-identification
An aspect of uncertainty relates to what extent the data maintained in
the blockchain ledger must be anonymized or deleted to comply with the
principle of storage limitation, art. 5 (1) (e) GDPR.187 The storage limitation
principle means that the identification of data subjects cannot be for more
than what is necessary for which the personal data is processed.188 But not all
techniques for anonymization are equally effective.189 When the data subject
is no longer identifiable because data has been anonymized, the respective
data is no longer personal data. Therefore, this case is outside the scope of
data protection law.
However, when data has been pseudonymized, they are still covered by
the GDPR. According to E.U. law, “pseudonymisation” is the processing of
personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be
attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information,
provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to
183
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technical and organizational measures to ensure that the personal data is not
attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.190 Data encryption
can be the solution, as the pseudonym does not redirect to the data subject
without knowing a decryption key. The issue of data encryption is that
people not entitled to use the decryption key may still re-identify the data
subject. The public key and transactional data on a distributed ledger can be
deemed compatible with GDPR, only when they do not qualify as personal
data. In contrast, when the public key and transactional data qualify as
personal data, GDPR applies and compliance with the obligations by the
controllers and processors is compulsory.
The Article 29 Working Party embraces a zero-risk approach, which
means that the risk of identification after rendering data anonymous ought to
be zero. Anonymization results from processing personal data in order to
irreversibly prevent identification of the data subject.191 However, some
authors consider that a risk-based approach is compatible with GDPR recital
26.192 This means that the question on the determination of personal data
remains whether a reasonable risk of identification exists.193 Only when the
risk is negligible, data could be treated like anonymous data. It remains
controversial if the GDPR imposes a zero-risk approach, considering that in
line with recital 26, data becomes anonymous when “the data subject is not
or no longer identifiable.”194 The problematic issue appears to be the
inclusion of technological developments as an objective factor to identify a
person. If assessing data is understood as a dynamic and periodical process,
future re-identification of previously anonymized data could be a foreseeable
scenario.195
Thus, establishing a high threshold like a zero risk of identification
could not be realistic in the medium- and long-term for processing personal
data through blockchains technologies. If a specific ledger is used for a
specific time frame, it should be assessed for that period of time, considering
that “[anonymization] should not be regarded as a one-off exercise and the
attending risks should be reassessed regularly by data controllers.”196
Nevertheless, the fact that a ledger is seen as an immutable record of
transactions without a specific time frame envisages that most data could at
some point make identifiability possible, either by singling out an individual,
linking records or making inferences from the information available. If we
190
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assume that anonymization or personalization is not an isolated property of
data but a property of the environment of data,197 one practical solution could
be to consider payload added to the blockchain as personal data, when
designed to be used without a time limitation,198 because it would be
foreseeable that the desired identification would be possible in the future.
Another important aspect to consider is from which perspective the
likelihood of identifying natural persons should be examined. It seems
appropriate that only the data controller should be considered. The opening
view of analyzing the possibility of identification from a third party may be
burdensome. For example, initiating legal proceedings against a third person
who has the additional information to make possible the identification of the
data subject does not seem a reasonable option. For these purposes, the
CJEU in the Breyer case notices that “it appears that the online media
services provider has the means which may likely reasonably be used in
order to identify the data subject, with the assistance of other persons,
namely the competent authority and the internet service provider, on the
basis of the IP addresses stored.”199 In this sense, the means may be
understood as political or legal power of a State. In Breyer, even though the
judgment refers to the State acting as an individual, the CJEU considers that
legal channels exist for the German Federal institutions, who provide the
online media services and who are responsible for the processing of dynamic
IP addresses in the event of cyberattacks.200 So, the online media services
provider is able to contact the competent authority, who can take the steps
necessary to obtain information from the internet service provider and bring
criminal proceedings.201
However, an individual (not a State) does not usually have the
necessary means unless he or she is the data controller or the data processor
of the data. Imagine a user in a blockchain must resort to initiate legal
proceedings against a third person who has the additional information to
make possible the identification of the data subject. Under this scenario, it
does not seem reasonably likely that he or she can access the personal
information.202
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ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PARTICIPANTS

The distribution of responsibility for blockchain functions is a thorny
issue. Lack of legal certainty and lack of agreement on interpretation
between the supervisory authorities in the European Union is creating a
sense of de-regulation of blockchain technologies. However, determining
who is a "data controller" or a "data processor" becomes essential in order to
exercise responsibilities that come into force and data subjects can claim and
exercise their fundamental rights established in article 8 of the EUCFR and
reinforced by the GDPR.
A. Data Controller
The importance of identifying a data controller is two-fold. First, it
defines the degree of responsibility for participants, consequently, the scope
of accountability and the degree of eventual liability. Second, it enables
communications from data subjects and data protection authorities to data
controllers. A specific contact may be necessary for data subjects in order to
exercise their rights, such as the right to an effective judicial remedy against
a controller or processor enshrined in article 79 of the GDPR.203 Likewise,
an identified data controller ensures supervisory authorities to be able to
exert its investigative and corrective powers under article 58 of the GDPR,
which includes to notify controllers or processors of an alleged infringement
or any other contact necessary to carry out its tasks.204
The underlying assumption of reckoning with a data controller in any
case of processing of personal data may be challenged by blockchain’s
functioning. The usual infrastructure is decentralized and connected but
independent. Different players compose the network without an apparent
hierarchy among them. In a public and permissionless scenario, it may be
particularly burdensome to distribute responsibility among the players. Yet,
allocating responsibility is essential to allow data subjects make complaints
against controllers. At the same time, controllers have a wide range of tasks
and bear the burden of proof of compliance with data protection rules and
principles laid down in article 5(1) of the GDPR.205
Under E.U. law, a controller is defined as a natural or legal person,
public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others,
determines the purposes and means of the processing of the data.206 Thus,
where the person decides why and how data shall be processed he or she is
deemed to be a controller. Convention 108 defined it in a different way,
203
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giving examples of what you need to “control” to be considered a
controller.207 For instance, who is competent according to the national law to
decide what should be the purpose of the automated data file, which
categories of personal data should be stored, and which operations should be
applied to them are considerations for establishing a controller.208 Therefore,
the traditional concept of controller under the Council of Europe Convention
played a limited role in comparison with a dynamic and wider scope of
“controller” under E.U. law.
First, the notion of “controller” is built independently and
autonomously from national laws in contrast to the legal conferral necessary
under Convention 108. Second, according to the Article 29 Working Party,
the concept of “controller” is functional based on a factual analysis.209 The
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)
case illustrates the importance of a factual analysis. SWIFT is a company
offering standardized messaging services to financial institutions. Its
structure is a cooperative network with their headquarters in Belgium,
operating centers in Europe and the United States, and branches in several
E.U. Member States.210 While SWIFT was formally considered a processor
of personal data in messages between financial institutions, it de facto acted
as a data controller, at least to the extent when it decided to transfer financial
personal data to U.S. authorities through a non-transparent agreement
without informing the financial institutions concerned.211 Pursuant to Article
29 Working Party, a significant degree of autonomy and an effective margin
of maneuver were decisive in considering SWIFT a controller.212 Besides,
processing personal data for the purpose of fighting against terrorism was
incompatible with the original commercial purpose for which personal data
has been collected.213 Therefore, the identification of a controller in terms of
conditions or a legal contract is not final, as long as it can be modified by a
court judgement under a functional approach, rather than a formal analysis.
Reflections on the different type of players in a public and permissionless
blockchain are considered below.
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Developers

Developers do not process personal data, unless they run nodes or mine
new blocks. However, developers of the code control the core software,
which potentially give them a high degree of control over how processing
data (eg. Bitcoin). Yet, even with the option to design, developers may not
qualify as controllers, because they only make available the software to the
user. Indeed, they neither have control over the use of the software nor on
which content is actually stored on it.214 They determine neither the concrete
purposes nor the means of data processing. This perspective from a microlevel can be convincing, but from a macroeconomic level, developers have a
function in why and how a blockchain is structured. They can design default
blockchains that comply with GDPR when it is agreed that personal data are
processed on a specific blockchain.
Preventing any liability of developers excluding them from being
controllers might not seem reasonable in comparison to users; for the mere
fact that users of a blockchain are controllers but they do not have any real
alternative to use another type of blockchain for a specific transaction, for
example, exchanging bitcoins.215 The use of blockchains to offer services to
E.U. citizens or residents is enough to trigger the territorial scope of
application of the GDPR.216 In order to comply with GDPR, developers that
plan to create a public blockchain to exchange real estate, should comply
with privacy by design and by default.217 This means that they should be
encouraged to creating blockchain solutions with privacy as an initial
consideration rather than as an add-on “when developing, designing,
selecting and using applications, services and products that are based on the
processing of personal data or process personal data.”218 Indeed, developers
should design a system “with due regard to the state of the art, to make sure
that controllers and processors are able to fulfil their data protection
obligations.”219 Some suggest that blockchain developers will in many cases
be forced to contend with “partial solutions, heuristics and mechanisms that
are designed to bring privacy to specific classes of applications.”220 But is it
214
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not the essence of Article 8 of the EUCFR to adopt “technical and
organizational measures” which are able to ensure that personal data is given
effective protection against any risk of abuse and against unlawful access
and use?221
A projection of the reasoning of the Working Party on the
determination of who are controllers for data processing in social networks
to the context of blockchain can clarify the issue of controllership. In
principle, the entity that offers the blockchain can be deemed to establish the
“means for processing the user data” and consequently, that entity will be
responsible for the “means” being developed following the privacy-bydesign requirements. Therefore, it seems unlikely that public blockchains
that do not have a governance mechanism will be accepted by regulators,
particularly when consumer rights are at stake.222
2.

Miners and Nodes

Miners run the protocol and play a leading role for the operation of a
blockchain infrastructure because they gather transactions in new blocks
according to a consensus mechanism, such as proof-of-work.223 Nodes add
data to the shared ledger and store a copy of the ledger in the devices.224
They maintain the infrastructure in exchange of a reward, usually a
cryptocurrency; but miners do not control the content of the data transfer.225
On one hand, without the work of miners, blockchains may not
function. Thus, miners are responsible for the means. However, they do not
define the purposes of a transaction because they act on behalf of users.226
For the latter reason miners may not be considered “controllers.” Some
authors have advanced that the role of nodes and miners in Bitcoin is passive
as they merely process the bitcoin sender and recipient’s addresses, the
public key of the transaction sender, the public key of the transaction
recipient, a cryptographic hash of the transaction content, the amount of BTC,
221
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and the date and time of the transaction.227 Miners, neither alone nor jointly,
have influence on the inclusion of the transactions in the Bitcoin
blockchain.228 If a single miner places an invalid transaction in his block, his
block will be discarded by the remaining miners. Miners have the
opportunity to exclude certain transactions, but the group of miners cannot
be clearly determined either, unless it is a mining pool. For reasons of
security rather than privacy, a pool of more than 50% of Bitcoin's total
computing power endangers the confidence in Bitcoin, so mining pools
themselves ensure that they remain below the 50% limit.229 As a result,
nodes and miners in Bitcoin do not decide on the purpose and the means of
data processing, so they should not be considered controllers.230
On the other hand, nodes can have different functions, but usually
initiate a transaction or save a copy of the transaction in its database. First, to
determine controllership “in case of doubt, other elements than the terms of a
contract may be useful to find the controller, such as the degree of actual
control exercised by a party, the image given to data subjects and reasonable
expectations of data subjects on the basis of this visibility.”231 According to
some authors, miners pursue its own interest whilst registering and verifying
whether transactions have the format or signatures, apart from storing
data.232 They maintain the ultimate authority to adopt a new software which
modifies or amends a blockchain protocol.233 Besides, “miners can rewrite
the transaction history of the shared database or implement additional
controls that shape how information is stored, processed, and recorded.”234
It has been pinpointed that in practice, treating miners as controllers
will not be feasible in large public blockchains, considering the case of
proof-of-work consensus.235 However, the relative importance of a node does
not come from its special characteristics, but from its ability to contribute to
the effectiveness of the network to achieve its objectives, defined by the
227
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values and interests programmed in the networks.236 Along the same lines, if
it is not feasible to consider miners as controllers, the same conclusion could
be reached in relation to nodes as controllers.
Nevertheless, recent literature shows that qualifying nodes as
controllers is an option, when they verify the format of the transactions,
participate in the validation of new blocks, or store a copy of the
blockchain.237 Besides, miners have the ability to discern whether a
transaction is cryptographically or technically valid.238 Consequently, they
can be considered controllers because they participate in the network for
their own benefit.
For example, the Libra Association, established in Switzerland,239
would be considered a controller if processes personal data with a significant
level of autonomy in relation to the cryptocurrency libra. The reasoning is
similar to the SWIFT case, where the level of autonomy in deciding to
establish a data hub in the United States and disclosing of data to U.S.
authorities were decisive in assessing that SWIFT was a controller in relation
to its personal data processes.240
In cloud contexts, providers of cloud computing services are processors
when they offer computer resources to store data. It is considered that the
cloud provider is merely processing personal data on behalf of the customer
who is the controller. A processor means “a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of
the controller.”241 Following this reasoning, nodes and miners are likely to be
considered processors when they facilitate users to store and transfer
information, as the users submit the personal data for their own purpose.
This approach is shared with CNIL. Miners can be processors and not
controllers because they are only validating transactions, rather than defining
the purposes and means of the processing.242
Overall, the relevant aspect is whether nodes and miners are processing
personal data on behalf of users or whether they are taking an active role. If
they adopt a passive role facilitating the transactions, they still should be
regarded as processors by analogy with cloud providers.
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Users

Part of the literature suggests that users are controllers with relation to
their own data and the others’ personal data.243 At first sight, this
consideration appears to be affirmative. The decision of users to utilize a
blockchain network triggers the applicability of a data controller’s
obligations. In bitcoin’s case, the sender and recipient’s Bitcoin addresses
and transactional data are personal data. Therefore, a user who decides to
send an amount of Bitcoins to a recipient determines the purpose
(transferring ownership over a token) and the means of processing. From this
perspective, nodes and miners are acting on behalf of users. The CJEU
emphasized that the definition of the concept of “controller” deserves a
broader interpretation in order to ensure an effective and complete protection
of data subjects.244 In Google Spain, the fact that a search engine does not
exercise control over the personal data published on the web pages of third
parties does not lead to an exclusion of controllership by the operator of the
Google search engine.245 Therefore, users are the only data controllers,
disregarding of the level of control on the personal data.
However, the problem of applying this approach to blockchain
networks is the current imbalance between individual users and large service
providers, such as mining pools. An application of an analogy of the cloud
environment does not seem appropriate, because that demands users
choosing blockchain networks that comply with data protection regulation.246
Some type of guidelines from networks or from third parties that certify
whether a blockchain network abide by privacy laws are necessary to take an
informed decision about the blockchain technologies that are compliant with
data protection laws. Without any kind of advice, determining whether a
blockchain network is GDPR-compliant seems tricky. Would it be
reasonable for a mere notice appearing in the network stating that a specific
blockchain network is compliant with GDPR? Appropriate awareness from
the outset is essential to make an informed choice as a customer-user.
The certification mechanism pursuant to article 42 of the GDPR could
be useful for the purpose of enhancing transparency about the embedded
software of a specific blockchain technology.247 Although this certification is
not mandatory, its voluntary character248 would be a good step in the
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direction of facilitating users to take an informed decision about choosing an
application that is GDPR-compliant.
4.

Household exemption for users

When a person enters personal data on a blockchain, the key question
to answer is whether the individual acts in relation to a household activity or
to a commercial or professional activity. In the first scenario, a person who
only buys and sells bitcoins on his behalf cannot be considered a data
controller. In contrast, if the same activity is carried out by the same person,
but on behalf of another natural person, he or she can be deemed to be a data
controller.249 It can entail that the data controller does not necessarily own
the data.250 However, the guidelines from CNIL are not in line with the strict
interpretation of the household exemption developed by the CJEU case law.
First, in the Bodil Lindqvist case, the criteria is not only the nature of
the activity (private versus commercial), but also the scope of the
dissemination of personal data.251 The uploading of personal data on a
website, making it accessible to an indefinite number of people changes the
situation. Consequently, the shield of the household exemption disappears.
The possibility to monitor blockchain transactions recorded on a public and
permissionless blockchain allows anyone to see personal data, even without
downloading the software.252
Regarding the scope of dissemination, the guidelines offered by the
Article 29 Working Party on online social networking can be useful. The
Social Networking Service (SNS) providers and third-party application
providers are data controllers, but users can also be considered data
controllers.253 The difficult task is to determine when a user is acting out of
the household exemption, so duties and responsibilities with data protection
applies. The configuration of a user profile as public, for example, which
permits anyone on the social network to see postings from the user or having
data indexed by search engines available to a high number of contacts are
indications that access goes beyond self-selected contacts, and therefore,
beyond private and family life of the individuals.254 The CJEU has
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reaffirmed a restrictive approach to the household exemption in three cases:
Satamedia,255 Rynes,256 and Sergejs Buivids.257
In Rynes, the fact that the camera recording was installed by an
individual on his family home for the purposes of protecting the property,
health and life of the home owners, but that it also monitored part of the
public space and was stored on a continuous recording device made the
CJEU exclude such processing of data from the course of a purely personal
or household activity.258
The Sergejs Buivids case concerned a citizen who published a video on
YouTube recorded on a police station while he was making a statement in
the context of administrative proceedings which had been brought against
him. The citizen did not inform the police officers of the intended purpose of
the processing of personal data concerning them. He posted on YouTube
without restricting access to that video, thereby permitting access to personal
data to an indefinite number of people. The court concluded that the
processing of personal data at issue in the main proceedings did not come
within the context of purely personal or household activities.259
It should be kept in mind that, when the household exception is
inapplicable, the user may benefit from other exemptions and derogations,
such as journalistic, artistic or literary purposes.260 In these cases, a balance
must be struck between privacy and freedom of expression. However,
exemptions and derogations to the protection of the fundamental right to data
protection must apply only in so far as it is strictly necessary.261 Processing
personal data that has been available in the media does not imply to be
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outside the scope of data protection rules.262 The CJEU held that if the
activities’ object of a company is solely the disclosure to the public of
information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium used to transmit
processed data, the activities can benefit from the journalist exception.263
The exception is not only available to media undertakings and can be used
for profit-making purposes. The Satamedia case involved collection of fiscal
data published in public documents related to income taxes and wealth taxes
and then, published it on a newspaper, with the identification of the
municipality and surname of individuals, transferred onward on CD-ROM to
be used for commercial purposes and making it available by a text-message
service surname. The CJEU left to national courts to decide if the private
company, Satamedia, could be covered by the exemption of journalistic
purposes. Finnish authorities considered that publishing of taxation
information to such an extent shall not be regarded as journalism, but as
processing of personal data which a company had no right to do.264
This ruling has been confirmed by the ECtHR, which accepts the ruling
by the Finnish authorities, as the derogation for journalistic purpose in article
9 of the Data Protection Directive must be subject to strict interpretation.265
According to the ECtHR, “the existence of a public interest in providing
access to, and allowing the collection of, large amounts of taxation data did
not necessarily or automatically mean that there was also a public interest in
disseminating en masse such raw data in unaltered form without any
analytical input.”266 It has been interpreted that the concept of “journalism”
suffers from a reduction, in contrast to recital 153 and article 85 of the
GDPR, which embrace a broader concept of freedom of expression and
information.267
262
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B. Joint Controllership
Several participants acting as a group can share its responsibility.
Under article 26 of the GDPR,268 all participants in a public and
permissionless blockchain can be deemed joint controllers, but they will
need to distribute responsibilities. The CNIL recommends to select one
participant as a data controller where that participant makes decision for the
group.269 This situation would avoid joint controllers, but absent the
identification of a data controller, potentially all participants can be
considered data controllers, subject to GDPR article 26 with the subsequent
shared responsibilities.
Advocate General Jääskinen warned against the risks of broad
definitions of personal data, processing of personal data and controller,
because they “are likely to cover an unprecedently wide range of new factual
situations due to technological development.”270 In his opinion, the CJEU
should apply the principle of proportionality, a rule of reason, in interpreting
the scope of the Data Protection Directive in order to avoid unreasonable and
excessive legal consequences.271 By the same token, the CJEU decided in
Bodil Lindqvist regarding the transfer of personal data to third countries in
the context of the Internet.272 It rejected a wide scope of application of article
25 of the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, a moderate approach can
avoid the unreasonably wide scope of application of the GDPR to define
joint controllership for public blockchains.
However, the CJEU has confirmed a broad interpretation of the
concept of joint-controllership in the Wirtschaftsakademie SchleswigHolstein case.273 The administrator of a fan page hosted on Facebook must
be categorized as a joint-controller, together with Facebook. The
administrator may define the parameters of the target audience and the
objectives of managing and promoting its activities, contributing to the
processing of the personal data of visitors to its page. It was decisive that the
administrator of the fan page can ask for demographic data, location data and
consumer behavior on line related to the target audience. Moreover, the
administrator of a fan page was contributing to install cookies on devices of
visitors since the moment they visit the mentioned fan page, whether or not
the visitor has a Facebook account. The CJEU held that the joint
268
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responsibility is shared between the operator of the social network and the
administrator of a fan page hosted on that network, which is justified to
ensure more complete protection of the rights of persons visiting a fan page
concerning the processing of their personal data.274 Thus, the concept of data
controller deals with assigning responsibilities based on the ability to
influence the purpose and method of data processing, which inevitably
results in a case-by-case analysis. Yet, it must be emphasized that joint
controllership neither imply equal responsibility of the various operators
involved in the processing of personal data nor it is required each of the coresponsible to have access to the personal data concerned.275
Further, the Fashion ID case advocates for a wide interpretation of
joint-controllership.276 The case was related to the Facebook “like” plugin
that is embedded on a web page (Fashion ID). The operator of a web page
becomes responsible for the processing of personal data by the mere fact of
inserting a plugin, and regardless of whether the administrator of a website
does not have the ability to determine the data that the browser transmits or
what the external provider does with the data. That is, despite not having
control over whether the external provider (Facebook) decides to store or to
analyze the data, the operator of that website is responsible for the operations
of collecting and transmitting personal data of its visitors. Particularly
relevant is the fact, that the CJEU considers that Fashion ID has consented,
“at least implicitly, to the collection and disclosure by transmission of the
personal data of visitors to its website by embedding such a plugin on that
website is in order to benefit from the commercial advantage consisting in
increased publicity for its goods.”277
According to the CJEU, two reasons are significant in order to reach
the conclusion that Fashion ID is a controller. First, it appears to be the
awareness of the administrator of the website. Fashion ID has exerted a
decisive influence over the collection and transmission of the personal data
of visitors to that website to the provider of that plugin by embedding that
social plugin on its website.278 Therefore, without that plugin the collection
and transmission of personal data of visitors to that website would not have
occurred. Second, the Court distinguishes that the responsibility of the
operator of a website is greater vis-à-vis those who are not members of
Facebook in comparison with those who are members of the social network.
With regard to those not members of the social network, in a similar way to
274
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the Wirtschafsakademie case, the mere consultation of a website featuring
the Facebook ‘Like’ button automatically starts the processing of personal
data.279
Consequently, the administrator has the obligation to request the
consent of the interested party and to provide the pertinent information
regarding these specific operations.280 By contrast, with respect to the phases
before or after data collection and transmission, the administrator of the
website cannot be considered a controller,281 so the external provider is
solely responsible for the processing.
However, Advocate General Bobek cautioned against interpreting the
concept of controller or joint controller in a very inclusive way as the CJEU
has already done. What in principle serves to secure the effective protection
of personal data, it can become an unfair situation. Thus, when the allocation
of liability does not correspond to any control over the result, it “will
typically be seen as unreasonable or unjust.”282 If not an exact match, it
seems appropriate an adequate connection between control and liability. Or
in the terms of Advocate General Bobek, “there ought to be . . . at least a
reasonable correlation between power, control, and responsibility.”283 In fact,
it has been highlighted that given the configuration of the relations between
website administrators and the social network, how it has promoted the
insertion of the button in question, and the existing imbalance on many
occasions, the result of the judgment implies important obligations and
responsibilities for website administrators, that can be especially
burdensome for the administrators of certain websites.284
In the context of blockchain, the risk increases because following the
recent case law, the mere choice of a Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
to process data may trigger that the user can be considered a controller,
without any need to have control over the purposes and the means of
processing. Moreover, with the objective of ensuring an effective protection
of data subjects, is this protection not really decreasing when every user of a
blockchain is made responsible for it? The broad interpretation of jointcontrollership presents an additional risk, which is becoming very difficult of
delineating spheres of responsibilities. How are we going to ensure that
279
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making everyone responsible does not mean that no-one will be responsible
in fact?285 The Article 29 Working Party stressed that not being able to
directly fulfil all controller’s obligations does not exclude one from being a
controller.286 Therefore, in any case a controller will remain ultimately
responsible for its obligations and liable for any breach to them, regardless
of the inability to fulfill them with the additional danger of hiding
responsibilities if a number of people are held responsible.287 Indeed, the
result in such an unclear situation is the opposite of an effective and
complete protection of data subjects’ rights. The handicap is that nodes
cannot see personal data because they are encrypted and hashed. Thus, nodes
eventually qualified as controllers may not be able to fulfill the attached
obligations and satisfy the rights of data subjects, such as giving a copy of
the underlying personal data requested under the right of access.288
Furthermore, the European Parliament suggests that “blockchain users
may be both data controllers, for the personal data that they upload onto the
ledger, and data processors, by virtue of storing a full copy of the ledger on
their own computer.”289 However, would it be reasonable that anyone that
choses a DLT to process data can be categorized as controller, without any
need to have control over the purposes and the means of processing? If the
“mere fact of making use of a social network such as Facebook does not
make a Facebook user a controller jointly responsible for the processing of
personal data by that network,”290 by analogy a user of the blockchain
platform that does not have the tools to influence the network should not be
considered a controller. But joint responsibility does not necessarily imply
that the various operators have an equivalent responsibility with respect to
the same processing of personal data. On the contrary, agents may be
involved in different stages of treatment and in various degrees, so that the
level of responsibility for each of them must be assessed considering all
285
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relevant circumstances of the specific case.291 Thus, if it is argued that no
one controls the data, as everyone controls the data,292 and that more than
half of the computing power can change the rules of the blockchain network,
then a simple user is going to be a controller of blockchain, following the
broad interpretation of joint-controllership by the CJEU.
Overall, the objective to find an effective data protection conversely
would risk defending legal rights in an increasing uncertain environment,
because of the result of having potentially everyone liable of compliance
with data protection rules when power imbalance among actors exists.293
Considering a user as controller for third-party personal data on a public
blockchain may not seem reasonable when personal transaction data is
replicated in multiple copies stored on hardware of different users.
Therefore, an entity must be provided to enable the reception of requests or
claims by the affected data subjects in order to access, modify or delete their
personal data. Without de facto control, obligations such as those described
by the GDPR are meaningless, because it is very onerous demanding users to
comply with them, in particular, if they are natural persons.
VI.

ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PARTICIPANTS
A. Tension with the right to erasure

Both the right to rectification294 and the right to erasure295 form part of
the basic rights of data protection. If blockchain can embrace the right to
erasure, we do not see any problem in addressing the right to rectification.
This analysis will focus on the right to erasure, but the conclusion can also
be applied to the right to rectification.
A commentator states that GDPR terms prohibit using personal data on
a blockchain, because the information once entered on a blockchain it is not
erasable.296 As a result, it is necessary to rely on old versions of storing data,
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mainly off chain and unfortunately, this technology will not reach its full
potential.
First, the assertion that blockchain is immutable is debatable, or at least
misleading.297 The reason is that the ledger is not immutable from a technical
point of view. It is possible that nodes achieve consensus to correct local
versions of the ledger or revoke past transactions. The difficulty stems from
the configuration of the blockchain. Nodes may agree to force a fork,
changing the protocol to create a new version of the blockchain. However, it
is only considered suitable in specific circumstances. On public and
permissionless blockchain cooperation of more than half of the nodes is
necessary, which is inevitably costly and not a straightforward manner to
correct a record on a register.
The right to erasure is important for the effective application of data
protection principles, in particular, the principle of data minimization.
According to the data minimization principle, data processing must be
limited to what is necessary to fulfil a legitimate purpose.298 The right to
erasure often called the “right to be forgotten” enshrined in article 17 of the
GDPR is derived from the fundamental right to data protection.299 The right
to be forgotten consists of the right to delete or cancel personal data
connected to past events that may affect free personal development or even
human dignity of the data subject. The controller is the person in charge of
erasing personal data without undue delay on several grounds. As a result,
any problem to identify a controller will affect the option of data subjects to
enforce their rights under the GDPR, such as the possibility to direct a
complaint to them.
The consistency of data protection as a fundamental right incorporates
the need to give full effect to the data subject’s rights which is translated in
the implementation of de-listing decisions in such a way that they guarantee
the effective and complete protection of data subjects’ rights. The option of
skirting E.U. law should not be a possibility. Therefore, the Working Party
guidelines seem to adopt a worldwide approach in relation to the

297

Angela Walch, Blockchain's treacherous vocabulary: one more challenge for regulators, 21
J. OF INTERNET L. 1, 1 (2017) (“[R]ather than being an inherent characteristic, "immutability" of
blockchain records is a matter of debate, as high-profile events in the blockchain space have
shown that blockchain records are changeable at will by the people who comprise the
blockchain system, and it currently is unclear which variations of blockchain technology
actually create a record that even approaches immutability.”). See also id. at 10–16; Angela
Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. OF BANKING AND FIN. L.
713 (2016); Gideon Greenspan, The Blockchain Immutability Myth, COINDESK (May 9, 2017),
http://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-immutability-myth/ (“In blockchains, there is no such thing
as perfect immutability.”).
298
GDPR, supra note 10, art. 5(1)(c).
299
See id. art. 17.

2020]

RISKS OF BLOCKCHAIN

327

implementation of the right to be forgotten, when considering the internet
and domain names. It was recognized that de-listing should also be effective
on all relevant domains, including “.com” and not only on national
domains.300 In spite of the recognition of the right to data protection to
“everyone” laid down in article 8 of the EUCFR, which could mean no
actual correlation to the European Union, in practice, the Article 29 Working
party specifies that data protection authorities will focus on claims where
there is a clear link between the data subject and the Union, for instance,
where the data subject is a citizen or resident of an E.U. Member State.301
Hence, the explicit reference to everyone is modulated to data subjects with
an evident connection to the European Union, limiting de facto protection to
E.U. citizens or residents of a Member State. The scope of certain data
protection rights has been very controversial, in particular, the right to be
forgotten.302 In the landmark Google Spain decision, the court did not
specify the territorial scope of the measures related to the erasure of personal
data, which arose as an important aspect considering the diverging views
outside the European Union, and notably, in the United States.303
Recently, in its preliminary ruling on the Google LLC case,304 the
CJEU addressed the question of whether the right to de-referencing must be
carried out on a worldwide basis, with regard to all domain names used by
its search engine or within the European Union, only on the domain versions
corresponding to all Member States; or instead only with respect to the State
of residence of the person benefiting from the “right to de-referencing.”305
The court opted for a reasonable and prudent solution, answering the
questions jointly. The ruling limits the territorial scope of the right to be
forgotten, insofar as search engines are obliged to eliminate in principle the
results not worldwide, but in the versions that correspond to the Member
States of the European Union, combining it with geolocation mechanisms
300
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that have the effect of preventing or, at the very least, seriously discouraging
internet users in the Member States from gaining access to the links in
question from the territory of the Union.306
The last ruling further elaborates a rationale on how de-listing the links
worldwide would meet the objective of guaranteeing a high level of personal
data protection throughout the European Union in full, since the Internet is a
global network and listing a link with information referring to a person
located in the European Union is “likely to have immediate and substantial
effects on that person within the Union itself.”307
Nevertheless, four arguments support the decision against extending
de-listing worldwide. One argument is a factual issue, considering the state
of the law from a global perspective; notably, the actual divergence on the
right to de-listing in different States, as far as it is not a right in some States.
The second argument is based on the data protection right. Although it has
the status of a fundamental right, it is not absolute, which obliges to strike a
balance “against other fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle
of proportionality.”308 The third argument is founded on the lack of intention
of the European legislature to extend rights beyond the territory of the
European Union related to a textual interpretation of the Directive and the
GDPR.309 Finally, a cooperation mechanism for supervisory authorities does
not exist with regard to the scope of de-referencing of links outside the
Union in contrast with the right to have access to information.310
In addition, the court emphasized that E.U. law does neither require
that de-referencing in all versions of the search engine in question, nor
prohibit such a practice. This ruling can open a door for uncertainty because
a supervisory or judicial authority of a Member State is competent to balance
the protection of personal data with the right to freedom of information and
after an analysis on a case-by-case basis, the national authority can oblige
the operator of a search engine to de-referencing in all versions of that search
engine.311 Yet, this interpretation is consistent with article 85 of the GDPR
that enables Member States to enact laws in order to reconcile the right to the
protection of personal data with the right to the protection to freedom of
expression and information.312 As a result, national standards that weigh up
the accommodation of two fundamental rights do not have to be uniform.

306

Id. ¶ 53–54.
Id. ¶ 55–57.
308
Id. ¶ 60.
309
Id. ¶ 62.
310
Google LLC, supra note 143, ¶ 63.
311
Id. ¶ 72.
312
See GDPR, supra note 10, art. 85.
307

2020]

RISKS OF BLOCKCHAIN

329

However, the problematic question is how to interpret the right to
erasure and modification within the framework of blockchain. Considering
that in the absence of trust, blockchain’s will is to enhance data integrity, not
allowing to modify or erase data once entered on the blockchain. By an
orthodox definition, “a ledger is a database which keeps a final and
definitive record of transactions.”313 In other words, DLT is tamperproof or
deliberated designed to avoid a modification. Thus, records, once stored,
cannot be modified without leaving behind a mark.
To solve the tension between blockchain and the right to erasure, the
options vary from the most permissible to the most orthodox. Should we
make an exception in order to feed and promote the potentialities of
blockchain? Or on the contrary should we read strictly the GDPR and
conclude that if personal data entered in the blockchain cannot be erased or
modified, this technology should not be put in place, at least on a broad
scale.314 The European Parliament recommended that “blockchain
technology should not be used for the processing of personal data until the
user [organization] concerned is in a position to guarantee compliance with
the GDPR and to specifically ensure that the rights to the rectification and
erasure of data are protected.”315 However, this can become an obstacle of
innovation, stifling our technological future, lagging behind the most
technological nations. It seems that the European Union is doing precisely
the opposite, for example, multiple initiatives are currently researching how
it would be possible to apply blockchain to public services.316
B. Proposed Solutions
An alternative to a strict interpretation of a complete elimination of the
data may be to limit the processing by inspiration in some laws of the
Member States. Some national laws do not oblige to delete the data when it
is not possible in the case of non-automated processing in a specific way of
storage.317 Since not all national laws allow such possibility, for instance,
313
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Spanish law containing the right to erasure refers to article 17 of the
GDPR,318 this interpretation could hamper the original objective of the
regulation, which is to avoid the fragmentation of the applicable law within
the European Union. However, the GDPR does not provide a full exhaustion
of powers by Member States. Indeed, some provisions set out that Member
States are allowed to determine certain aspects, for instance, the age to
consent in minors319 or the setting or national standards to reconcile the right
to data protection with other fundamental rights.320 Therefore, the
alternatives to the right to erasure could be set for in a not uniform manner
across the Member States. This situation may not be optimal, but can be a
temporary result until the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) develops
guidelines for all Member States in the future. One interpretation is
considering that an exemption exists because of technical blockchain
technology limitations. Article 17(2) of the GDPR refers to the “account of
available technology and the cost of implementation” when the data
controller has to answer to a request for erasure.321 However, specific
technological advances like an editable blockchain could help to limit the
problem, where in the end depends on having computing power to reverse
the situation.322
A reinterpretation of the concept of erasure, by softening it, could
allow that specific technological techniques that “hide” personal data can
comply with the right to be forgotten. For instance, the chameleon hashes
allow to edit, remove or rewrite certain data. Against this approach, concern
related to denature blockchain appears since it will be necessary a trusted
body to judge where it is necessary to edit the blockchain.323 Apparently, the
solution does not eliminate the risk of miners not willing to comply with the
orders of the trusted body and the old copies remain in the blockchain
infrastructure, in particular, where miners are located abroad. Indeed, they
tend to locate in certain parts of the world usually benefiting of lower
electricity costs, where there is the highest concentration of hardware. The
great example is Bitcoin and the concentration of miners in large areas
(mining fields) as a new form of investment in China or in the United
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States.324 This means that the “volunteers” (servants of the infrastructure)
that make it work may not be encouraged to comply with European privacy
legislation on personal data stored in the blockchain, maybe because it is
costly to implement several of the solutions that can mitigate the exposure of
personal data in blockchain. In addition, such dependence with countries
whose standards are different can make public and permissionless
blockchain not developing at the expected speed, precisely because the
entities that can make use of the new technology do not trust that their data
will be safe through nodes that are outside the borders of the European
Union.
In our opinion, making data inaccessible on a blockchain could be
equivalent to erasure in a similar way that de-listing in a search engine has
not to be deployed worldwide based on the Google LLC case.325 This could
be assimilated to what happens in social networks when an operator is
obligated to comply with a request for erasure at the source; but this does not
(necessarily) lead to a complete erasure because once content has been
shared on the social network, third parties might not be subject to European
data protection law.326 Applying this reasoning to blockchain, a copy stored
on a node might be “erased” (in the sense of making inaccessible), but nodes
not subject to European jurisdiction could still have a copy of that personal
data. This would lead to a smart enforcement of data protection rules.
Moreover, making data inaccessible could be reached using different
techniques. One could be the destruction of the private key327 and another
using pruning techniques for the purpose of removing the personal data at
issue.328
Another possible scenario is that exemptions to the right to be forgotten
may be applicable. Perhaps the most significant one may be to comply with a
legal obligation, because the law of the European Union or a Member State
so dictates by virtue of article 17(3)(b) of the GDPR.329 This can be the case
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of storing personal data due to “national commercial or tax law.”330
Therefore, compliance with legal obligations can be an exception of the right
to be forgotten also in the blockchain context.
Faced with a mistake or a hacker attack, it has been experienced how
the community has reacted and adapted to the circumstances. The DAO has
exemplified a real situation of how the effects of a hacking can be reversed.
In the case the hacker exploited a weakness of the Ethereum software, so that
part of the DAO funds in Ether went to the hacker account. Fortunately, a
fork was conceived to return all the Ether taken from the DAO to refund a
smart contract. Investors could receive 1 ETH for every 100 DAO, in other
words, changes of the protocol were allowed. Supporters of reversing the
situation consider that human beings should have the final decision through
social consensus.331 The decision was taken by a qualified majority of
89%.332 Since 2016, Ethereum split into two chains, the main Ethereum
chain (ETH) and the Ethereum classic (ETC). Hence, technology through a
hard fork that represents a change in a protocol was used to plow back an
unjustified situation. Those who opposed to change the protocol gave
grounds for maintaining the essence of blockchain immutability and at the
same time the core part of a smart contract, basically no need for human
hand for execution of the contract.
However, it could be understood that a protocol is not independent
from the community that support and feed it. When the community agrees to
change the protocol, if this is adopted via consensus of the decentralized
community and to address a present and clear danger to its network, it seems
to be justified.333 Thus, if the organization does not want an immutable
ledger, why should the technology constraint it?
In reality, technology is the result of a human mind. The use of
blockchain cannot be operative outside the law. In the same way that Internet
development was influenced by geographical borders because “Internet users
around the globe demanded different Internet experiences that corresponded
to geography,”334 and not only as a result of national governments,
companies and entities will adapt blockchain technologies to their structural
necessities. For public records of property or insolvency companies,
330
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blockchain can provide a new way of managing and registering them as legal
persons do not enjoy the right to data protection; whereas for other purposes
and applications of blockchain like smart contracts, parties will tackle the
challenges of using an execution of the contract that carries out
automatically and where it is not possible to address supervening changes of
circumstances. Therefore, the immutability of the ledger shall need to adapt
to the will of the parties or may not be an effective alternative to execute a
complex contract.
Similar to the experience of the internet, which at the beginning it was
considered an anarchic space, but now it is regulated specially on
intermediaries’ actions and liabilities, blockchain technologies are raising the
awareness of governments. Governments’ interests will be shaped on the
blockchain technology with the intention to control it, but private actors will
also modulate the emerging technology to satisfy their needs and
accommodate differences among users and regions. Developments with
encryption will allow gaining trust in the blockchain from a data protection
perspective, when privacy enhancing technologies gain prevalence in the
market as they can specifically be designed to comply with existing
regulations.335 The challenge of decentralization based on blockchain will be
limited insofar as private actors tailor it to their interests pushed by
efficiency and storage concerns.
VII.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS AND TRADE-OFFS

A multi-pronged strategy would be appropriate to address the tension
between blockchains and GDPR. The privacy by design principle is
enshrined in article 25 of the GDPR.336 Privacy by design of blockchain
applications could be possible through different mechanisms. The use of
storing data off-chain mechanisms, encryption, hash functions, noise adding,
ring signatures, an editable blockchain, non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs are some techniques that can be embedded in blockchain applications
to comply with the GDPR.
A. Storing data off-chain mechanisms
A division of data storage can be a plausible solution to confront many
challenges, in particular, not all data has to be in the blockchain itself.
Basically, the designer of the blockchain can envision a different way to data
storage. Personal data can be stored on a database that is not integrated in
335
See David Harborth et al., Integrating Privacy-Enhancing Technologies into the Internet
Infrastructure, UNIVERSITÄT REGENSBURG (2016), https://epub.uniregensburg.de/36346/1/description_english.pdf.
336
See GDPR, supra note 10, art. 25.

334

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

the chain, rather it is linked to the distributed ledger via a hash. The problem
of classifying data as personal data is not solved by this technique, but once
it is clear which data is deemed personal data, the recommendation is to keep
them off-chain.337 The first solution could be not storing personal data in a
blockchain. For instance, when users of a blockchain are businesses, legal
persons, the platform could be configured in a permissioned manner to
reflect the settlement of interbank payments. As a result, a consolidated
amount of any bank would appear in the blockchain, avoiding storing
individual transactions.
However, some issues arise given that a possible solution to keep
transactional data in an off-chain data base cannot be applied to public keys.
The second concern is a philosophical question that limits the potential
benefit of using blockchain as a single and shared source of truth.338
Inevitably, the use of data storage in off-chain databases multiply the number
of records. Yet, this fact by itself is not a disadvantage from a security
perspective; because when data are stored in different records is less likely
that all records to be manipulated if compared to data stored on a centralized
secure ledger. Likewise, despite data is not kept in the ledger, a hash pointer
remains in the ledger, which raises doubts about how it ought to be managed
when the original personal data is rectified or erased.339
In addition, limiting ledger storage has been proposed as a privacy-bydesign solution.340 The idea is to store the entire ledger on one (or a few)
instances only, and to instruct all other nodes to delete the information on a
new block after verification has taken place. Therefore, two sources could be
consulted for verification purposes: the full ledger and the nodes maintaining
the verification purposes. Indeed, this solution could enable data subjects to
enforce their rights.
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B. Security Mechanisms: encryption and hashes functions
Anonymous data can be difficult to delineate from pseudo-anonymous
data. Encryption and hash functions are commonly used to provide a robust
security to personal data and it is often misunderstood that through them data
become anonymous. Far from the reality in most situations, encryption and
hashing techniques could not irreversibly produce anonymous data. First,
encryption works using a key. Whenever someone knows the key to decrypt,
personal data is still plain, so for the holder of the key, encrypted data is
always personal data. Second, hash functions are deterministic and operates
in a way that the same input always yields the same output. A computer can
solve the puzzle trying with different dataset, for example, email addresses,
names and social security numbers to check if the output (what hash is
revealed) coincides with a previously known output. Therefore, linking
between the two sets of data reveals that hashing does not transform personal
data in anonymous data. In principle, output data remain personal data as it
keeps to be pseudonymous, that is to say that with additional information, it
is possible to personalize pseudonymous data. Some kind of hash, as salted
hash and keyed hashes have been considered by the Article 29 Working
Party.341 Despite being methods that reduce the likelihood of deriving the
input value, it does not make impossible finding the input value.
Following a risk-based approach would make hash functions, even the
one with stronger privacy guarantees, not able to convert personal data in
anonymous data under GDPR.342 It is well-known, that using backdoors or
master keys makes possible to decrypt every message in an encrypted
software, but having access to that knowledge is not widespread. It is a
remarkable example that law enforcement agencies ought to use their
specific powers to target and investigate criminals without requiring
developers access to backdoors or master keys in a general manner.343 This
uncertainty regarding anonymization techniques spreads over blockchain
technologies, being possible to unveil personal data through repersonalisation, when that supposedly was secure enough and immune to it.
However, some have advocated to focus on who has the key access. In
Cloud Computing, if the provider has no key access, data are deemed to be
sufficiently well-encrypted data, and therefore, they ought not to be personal
data.344 It seems reasonable to assess whether anonymous data could be re341
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converted in personal data. In our opinion, this analysis must be done vis-àvis a specific person, such as the data controller. In the opposite case,
framing an absolute approach, taking into consideration anyone who may be
able to identify a data subject, could be a very broad definition, as rendering
impossible to examine if any third party is not capable to unveiling a person
identity. In fact, the Article 29 Working Party has recognized this issue as “a
very significant grey area.”345
The absolute perspective can be considered to protect effectively data
subjects in light of data protection as a fundamental right. For academics in
favor of protecting personal data, de-encryption must be considered from the
point of view of data controllers and third parties, justifying this
interpretation on the wording of GDPR recital 26 (“by the controller or by
another party.”).346 Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, this may be
very burdensome to implement. Considering an absolutist approach correct
would lead to examine anyone who was able to identify a person in
blockchain. For example, a third party can have no relation with the data
subject or even without being a user of the blockchain itself, but may be
capable of re-identify personal data, in particular, on public and
permissionless blockchains.
C. Available techniques to pursue anonymity
Some kind of data, such as health data or census data is mostly public
or semi-public and some basic characteristics (eg. ZIP code, gender, date of
birth) may likely identify persons.347 The addition of noise consists of
altering attributes by adding or removing a different random value for each
record.348 According to the Article 29 Working Party, adding noise may be
an acceptable anonymization technique.349 While adding noise to data as a
perturbation technique enhances privacy, the trade-off is shrinking data
utility, that is how useful a published dataset is to the consumer.350
in Cloud Computing? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 2 18 (Queen Mary Sch. of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 77/2011, 2011).
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Second, the technique called “multi-layered linkable spontaneous
anonymous group” allows to hide the origin, destination and amount of
transactions.351 This is based on digital signature which specifies a group of
possible signers, but the verifier cannot tell which member actually produced
the signature.
Third, editable blockchain permits exactly the modification of past
blocks, changing the way hash pointers link blocks.352 Editable blockchains
are becoming a feasible option, as some researchers state that implementing
a redactable blockchain requires only minor modifications to the current
structure of the blocks.353 Thus, it appears that this possibility could be used
in privacy-by-design applications. This would facilitate the exercise of
fundamental rights, in particular, the right to be forgotten, that was the most
technically controversial on a blockchain technology. Nevertheless, the
implementation of editable blockchains would require the appointment of
administrators to alter the ledger.
Fourth, merge avoidance tries to minimize the number of times that
you link accounts together by spending from them at the same time.
However, it is not a definite solution for privacy concerns.354
Fifth, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs use protocols where it is
not necessary that a prover and verifier are present during the execution of
the protocol. The prover generates a statement and the verifier can check its
validity later. It can be used to prove that someone is not a minor, without
providing personal data, such as your name, address or photos. Examples of
zero-knowledge protocols are implemented already in some cryptocurrencies
like Zcash and Zerocoin.355 These systems overcome the public exposure of
sensitive data by entering into Bitcoin transactions.356 New cryptocurrencies
offer stronger privacy, because it is only visible that a transaction has been
made, without disclosing public keys, amounts or sender and recipient
information. In this sense, they overcome deficits of Bitcoin, altering what is
recorded in the distributed ledger. However, it is worth noting that “as with
mixing systems, these techniques may only hide payees within a limited list
351
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of potential users, not all, which opens the way to de-anonymizing multiple
transactions.”357 In spite of this inconvenience, the European Parliament
encourages to fund academic research to conclude whether zero knowledge
proofs could be a way to comply by design with the data protection
requirements.358
D. Negative consequences of anonymity
Techniques to achieve anonymity solve a problem with regard to data
protection law. However, pursuing anonymity in blockchain transactions can
have negative consequences until the point of compromising the integrity of
markets, the protection of investors and consumers, and even economic and
financial stability of a given country. One of the criticisms of anonymous
cryptocurrencies is that they can be used to finance illegal activities359 or
even avoid economic sanctions against hostile countries, to such an extent
that they could pose national security risks.360
Some national governments have prohibited the use of cryptocurrencies
in the name of national interest, as well as techniques that prevent access to
underlying transaction data such as origin, destination and amount
exchanged.361
The following example illustrates how an asset that complies with
basic principles of data protection is not excluding of suffering devastating
consequences because of the characteristic of anonymity. Monero, which
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uses the Cryptonote protocol, is one of the most protective cryptocurrencies
for privacy.362 Cryptonote is based on an encryption system that requires
transactions to not just signed by a single person, but by several at once.363
For this, the system divides the amount of Moneros into two (unequal) parts
and mixes both with the Moneros of other users. In the end, it obfuscates,
mixes everything to make the transfers in such a way that it is impossible to
know the origin of the funds and which is the destination. The advantage of
this protocol is that Monero transactions are not linkable or traceable, that is,
it offers total anonymity to users.
However, its advantage is the source of the withdrawal of the
cryptocurrency from particular markets, since BitBay, based in Estonia, will
not trade with this cryptocurrency as from February 19, 2020.364 It is not the
first crypto exchange that proposed to exclude privacy-oriented currencies.
In September 2019, Upbit, based in South Korea, removed support for
several cryptocurrencies including Monero and Zcash.365 Some argue that if
a cryptocurrency remains viable, such as Bitcoin, it is due to the possibility
to know the origin of the money comparing it with Monero or Zcash.366 Yet,
one of the risks of using Bitcoin is namely the lack of privacy, for instance,
if someone mistakenly shares his Bitcoin address, anyone can check his
balance and the other addresses with which he has interacted; it can be
assimilated to give the password of your online banking details, with the
difference that banks usually add different kinds of security layers. As a
result, it seems more a firm decision links to the illegal use of the
cryptocurrency, which prevents the use by people who are not criminals and
who legitimately do not want to reveal how much money they have.
Virtual currencies can have a certain degree of anonymity as the
dropping of the statement "virtual currencies cannot be anonymous," from
the proposal on the definition of virtual currencies in a European Council
Directive reveals.367 Therefore, prohibiting a private cryptocurrency under
the law can be an ineffective policy, because technology will try to develop
techniques to overcome the law.
362
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CONCLUSION
There can be no one-size-fits-all legal response. In any case, the use of
blockchain is an alternative for every business or organization, not a
replacement. It shall be necessary to tailor appropriate legal solutions to each
case as outcomes will depend on how the technology is designed. The real
value of blockchain technologies lies in facilitating more efficient digitalassets transfers from an economic perspective.368 As a result, the applications
of blockchains have not yet reached their full potential, they can be used not
only for cryptocurrencies, but could also revolutionize transactions in other
trustless environments. In the private realm, authorship verification, title
transfers and contract enforcement could be transformed with blockchains.
Public institutions may also decide to implement blockchains in order to
manage and run public administration services. For example, they can
potentially facilitate the right to vote.
The definition of the blockchain protocol is key to understand the
characteristics of the infrastructure (public or private, permissioned or
permissionless). The various actors play different roles depending on the
characteristics defined at the infrastructural level. It seems appropriate to
analyze data protection law from a micro-perspective, in other words, what
happens in an individual transaction,369 in contrast to the macro-perspective.
Meanwhile the purpose of processing refers to recording a specific
transaction onto a blockchain; the means are deemed to be the choice of the
blockchain platform.
Blockchains are under the scope of the GDPR if they have a presence
in the European Union that can be considered establishment such having
nodes in the European Union; or under the market approach if they are
targeting or monitoring data subjects located within the Union. Therefore,
many public and permissionless blockchains will be under the scope of the
GDPR.
Public keys work as identifiers, so they are personal data under the
GDPR. The option of using one-time public keys will minimize the risk of
re-identification by singling out, linkability, or inference methods with
additional data. Additional data that is contained in the blockchain can be
considered personal data when meets the requirement of identifying a person
directly or indirectly. The cautious option is to use one-time public keys
methods with additional data and to avoid entering personal data on a plain
form in a blockchain. Using available encryption techniques will reduce the
risks of re-identification by singling out, linkability, or inference methods.
368
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With regards to identifying controller(s) or processor(s), the
configuration of a blockchain as private and permissioned could alleviate the
difficulty of complying with E.U. law. Yet the identification of controllers in
public and permissionless blockchains seems controversial. The relevant
aspect is whether nodes and miners are processing personal data taking an
active role or a passive role (on behalf of the users). If they adopt a passive
role facilitating the transactions, they still should be regarded as processors
by analogy with cloud providers. Users will be considered controllers, unless
they benefit from the purely domestic exception. However, the users’
exemption is read very narrowly by the CJEU. Considering most users of a
blockchain controllers will undermine the effectiveness of a full data
protection, because users may not know if they are interacting with
blockchains that are compliant with data protection law and personal
transaction data is replicated in multiple copies stored on hardware of
different users. Creating a certification mechanism to determine if a
blockchain application is GDPR-compliant could be a solution. However,
the lack of de facto control by most users will not allow an effective
enforcement of individual data protection rights. Therefore, developers
should be encouraged to build privacy-by-design blockchain applications.
Ruling on specific guidance on privacy-by-design to industry stakeholders
may be counterproductive and inimical to new developments.370 However,
privacy considerations should not be left to users alone in specific cases (evoting) and a privacy-by-design perspective from the organization running
the protocol ought to be expected.
Enforcing data subjects’ rights on a blockchain is not straightforward.
The proposed solution is that the right to erasure must be interpreted in a
contextual way. The option of making data inaccessible should qualify as
erasure, considering the reasoning of the Google LLC case. A copy stored on
a node might be inaccessible, but nodes not subject to European jurisdiction
could still have a copy of that personal data. Likewise, complying with a
legal obligation under another law will exempt the right to erasure as GDPR
provides. Moreover, a fork is not unfeasible as a blockchain protocol is not
independent from the community that support and feed it. With this
technique the modification of personal data is possible.
The use of storing data off-chain mechanisms, encryption, hash
functions, noise adding, ring signatures, an editable blockchain and noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs could foster privacy solutions. However,
these recommendations involve trade-offs that should be considered in each
particular use.
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In addition, it may seem a paradox to comment on the risks that
blockchains entail for privacy and data protection when most of the legal
attention paid to cryptocurrencies so far has focused on the risks of their
“secret” uses outside the law. Consequently, the greater the privacy
protections in the blockchain protocols, the more easily criminals, terrorists,
funders of illicit activities and tax evaders can pursue its ends.
However, the distributed nature of the public networks should not serve
as an excuse to neglect existing law for the protection of personal data.
Protecting personal data for users and ensuring transparency in certain
circumstances should be facilitated if required.371 As professor Zittrain wrote
on the future of the internet, but applying it to blockchain: the blockchain’s
future may be brighter if technology permits easier identification of
blockchain users combined with legal processes, and perhaps technical
limitations, to ensure that such identification occurs only when good cause
exists.372 Combining the best of both worlds should be the goal of privacyby-design blockchain networks. Conversely, the policy of prohibiting
blockchain technologies because they are too anonymous and can be used
for laundering money and financing terrorism should be taken very
cautiously. The risk of criminalizing users merely for using blockchain
technologies to carry out transactions is enormous. First, the quantity of
people using blockchains for legitimate purposes may be increasing.373
Second, blockchain applications that guarantee anonymity will still be used
by dishonest users.
Therefore, researchers should continue to implement public
blockchains designs to comply with data protection regulations, because the
benefits for mainstream individuals outweigh any potential illegitimate use.
Finally, the evolution of blockchain technologies will mirror the
evolution of the Internet itself, whose first users dreamed to decentralize
power, but now find it highly regulated and concentrated. It is remarkable
371
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how we accept in our era the dominance of technology, as if technology
were superior to human beings. In this line of reasoning, we cannot forget
that “technologies are always economic means, not ends in themselves: in
modern times, technology’s DNA comes already patterned by what the
sociologist Max Weber called the ‘economic orientation.’”374 Power
determines technology, selects certain technologies and discards others.
Blockchain technology will depend on a given network´s goals and
governance arrangements, including privacy concerns.
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